X. Copyright’s Relationship to Contract and Other State Laws

In this chapter, you will learn about copyright’s relationship to contract law and other state laws. First, we will study the particular rules and concerns surrounding the formation and interpretation of contracts governing copyright rights. Then, we will investigate what happens when people agree, via contract, to not engage in behavior that copyright law permits them to do (such as fair uses). We will also study whether certain contracting or other behavior by a copyright holder known as copyright misuse can lead to the unenforceability of the copyright against others. Finally, we will examine the circumstances in which copyright law preempts the enforcement of contracts. This introduction to copyright preemption provides a window to assess the viability of other state laws that abut copyright law.

A. Forming and Interpreting Contracts in Copyright

In this section, you’ll learn about the basic rules that govern contracts and licenses involving copyrights. Then, you’ll explore tools for interpreting contractual language in these agreements.

Copyright law allows authors to transfer their copyrights in whole or in part. Section 201(d) of the Copyright Act specifies:

(d) Transfer of Ownership.—

(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.

(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.

Recognize that § 201(d)(2) provides that each right in the bundle of copyright rights conferred by § 106 may be transferred and owned separately. A “transfer of copyright ownership” is broadly defined in § 101:

A “transfer of copyright ownership” is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.

Note that a transfer of copyright ownership does not include a nonexclusive license. Why do you think that is? More broadly, as a matter of copyright policy, is it a good idea to allow authors to transfer their copyright interests, or would it be better to require authors to retain control of their copyright interests? Does the free alienability of copyright rights tell you anything about copyright law’s purposes?

Section 204(a) specifies how to execute a valid transfer of copyright:

A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.
Note the three requirements for the transfer, other than by operation of law, to be valid: (1) a writing, (2) signed, (3) by the owner or the owner’s duly authorized agent. The writing need not be signed by the transferee. Nor need it contain any magic words; it is necessary only that the writing give evidence of the transferor’s intent to transfer the copyright interest. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[s]ection 204’s writing requirement not only protects authors from fraudulent claims” much like a statute of frauds, but it “also enhances predictability and certainty of ownership.” Kongsberg Int'l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994).

While courts have been consistent with respect to the required content of the writing, they have divided over the question of the writing’s timing—in particular, whether the writing must be contemporaneous with the transfer or can instead later memorialize an earlier transfer. Compare, e.g., id. (requiring a contemporaneous writing for a copyright transfer to be valid), with, e.g., Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Under the statute’s plain terms it is clear that an oral transfer can be given legal effect by a subsequent signed writing.”).

Recall from Chapter IV that transfers of copyright ownership can be recorded with the Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 205. So long as the document specifically identifies the work and the work has been registered, the recordation serves as “constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document.” Id. § 205(c). An unrecorded transfer is void against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value who records first. Id. § 205(d).

What do you think are the policy interests underlying the recordation provisions of the Copyright Act? Why might it be helpful to have the Copyright Office record transfers?

Given that nonexclusive licenses are deemed not to be transfers of copyright ownership, such licenses can be effective even without a writing—that is, they can be created orally or implied through conduct. As you read the following case, consider when the law ought to infer an implied nonexclusive license from the parties’ behavior. In such situations, how should a court infer the license’s specific terms?

Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Kevin Gagnon
542 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2008)

SMITH, J.: ...

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. AMS and Gagnon’s Relationship

[1] AMS [(Asset Marketing Systems, Inc.)] is a field marketing organization offering sales and marketing support to insurance marketing entities. From May 1999 to September 2003, [Kevin] Gagnon [doing business as Mister Computer] was an at-will, independent contractor for AMS, hired to assist with its information technology needs. Subsequently, Gagnon was asked to develop custom software for AMS. AMS was Gagnon’s largest client, accounting for 98% of his business. Jay Akerstein, a partner at AMS who later became the Chief Operating Officer, was Gagnon’s primary contact. Over the course of their four-year relationship, AMS paid Gagnon over $2 million, $250,000 of which was for custom software development and computer classes. Gagnon developed six computer programs for AMS.

[2] In May 2000, AMS and Gagnon entered a Technical Services Agreement (TSA), which was scheduled to expire on April 30, 2001. The TSA, printed on Mister Computer letterhead, set forth Gagnon’s fees and the
services to be provided. The services included “Custom Application Programming—Consultant will provide Contractor with specific add-on products to enhance Contractor’s current in-house database application,” and mentioned nothing about a license. The TSA was not renewed, though the relationship continued.

[3] AMS claims that on June 12, 2002, Gagnon signed a Vendor Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA). The NDA would have given AMS ownership of all intellectual property developed for AMS by Gagnon. Gagnon claims that the document is a forgery and that his signature cannot be authenticated.

[4] In June 2003, Gagnon proposed that AMS execute an Outside Vendor Agreement (OVA). The OVA included a Proprietary Rights clause providing:

Client agrees that all designs, plans, specifications, drawings, inventions, processes, and other information or items produced by Contractor while performing services under this agreement will be the property of Contractor and will be licensed to Client on a non-exclusive basis as will any copyrights, patents, or trademarks obtained by Contractor while performing services under this agreement. On request and at Contractor’s expense, Client agrees to help Contractor obtain patents and copyrights for any new developments. This includes providing data, plans, specifications, descriptions, documentation, and other information, as well as assisting Contractor in completing any required application or registration. Any source code or intellectual property will remain the property of Contractor. Trademarks, service marks, or any items identifying said Company shall remain the Company’s said property. Contractor will allow Company non exclusive, unlimited licensing of software developed for Company.

[5] Akerstein declined to execute the OVA, but countered with a redlined version of the OVA, which substantially rewrote the Proprietary Rights clause to read:

Contractor agrees that all designs, plans, specifications, drawings, inventions, processes, and other information or items produced by Contractor while performing services under this agreement will be the sole property of Client. Any source code or intellectual property agreed to and documented as Contractor’s will remain the property of Contractor.

[6] By the end of June 2003, AMS had decided to terminate Gagnon’s services. AMS extended an employment offer to Gagnon, but he declined to accept the offer. AMS and Gagnon then discussed an exit strategy, and by late July, the parties had set a target exit date of September 15, 2003.

[7] In August 2003, Gagnon responded to Akerstein’s redlined OVA draft with a letter asserting that his “position has always been that Asset Marketing Systems shall be entitled to unlimited software licensing as long as my company had a business relationship with Asset Marketing Systems.” The parties never executed the OVA.

[8] In a letter to AMS dated September 18, 2003, Gagnon demanded $1.75 million for AMS to have the right to continue to use the programs and $2 million for Gagnon’s agreement not to sell or disclose the programs to AMS’s competitors.

[9] In a letter dated September 23, 2003, AMS terminated its relationship with Gagnon. According to AMS, a consultant identified numerous problems with Gagnon’s work. It also stated:

Recently, we had discussed employee and intellectual property issues which have yet to be resolved. Despite the foregoing, I learned that we did not have copies of the source code for the software we developed and that copies of our SalesLogix software and our entire database may be maintained by you and your agents offsite.
The letter then demanded:

_In connection with that separation, you must immediately provide any and all copies of the source code for all software developed by and on behalf of Asset Marketing Systems immediately. You are not authorized to utilize that software which we believe is owned and all copyrights belong to Asset Marketing Systems._

**B. The Programs**

[11] Specifically at issue are the six programs that Gagnon created for AMS. He included a copyright notice, “copyright Mister Computer,” in the splash screens for each program.

[12] According to a declaration by one of Gagnon’s former employees, the programs were designed to work with AMS’s databases and included “detailed information concerning AMS’ network of sales persons, including information related to AMS’ agent lists, their territories, and the criteria used by AMS to qualify an agent or create a territory.” The source code for these programs was installed on several of AMS’s development computers, which were located at AMS’s facilities. The employee was not instructed by Gagnon to maintain the source code at any location other than AMS, and Gagnon made no attempt to hide the source code from AMS employees.

[13] In his deposition, Gagnon admitted that after he hired employees, the source code was stored on AMS computers in the development room. The room could not be accessed without a pass that Gagnon’s software developers and a few key AMS personnel, including Akerstein, possessed.

[14] A week prior to his termination, Gagnon registered the copyright for these six programs with the United States Copyright Office.

[15] ... [In an ensuing suit for copyright infringement, t]he court found that Gagnon had granted AMS an implied, nonexclusive license to use, modify, and retain the source code of the programs.

**DISCUSSION**

**A. Copyright Infringement Claim**

[16] Gagnon alleges that AMS’s continued use of the six programs constitutes copyright infringement because the programs were used by AMS without its obtaining a license or Gagnon’s permission. AMS asserts three defenses to Gagnon’s copyright infringement claim: an implied license, a transfer of copyright ownership via the NDA, and 17 U.S.C. § 117. We hold that AMS has an implied unlimited license for the programs, and we do not reach the other defenses asserted by AMS.

[17] Though exclusive licenses must be in writing, grants of nonexclusive licenses need not be in writing, and may be granted orally or by implication.

[18] ... [W]e have held that an implied license is granted when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute his work. The last prong of the ... test, however, is not limited to copying and distribution; instead we look at the protected right at issue—here, whether Gagnon intended that AMS use, retain, and modify the programs.

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*Gagnon disputes that the source code was ever stored on the AMS server.*
1. AMS Requested the Creation of the Programs

[19] Gagnon argues that AMS never specifically requested that he create the programs, but rather relayed its needs to Mr. Gagnon and he satisfied them by providing either computer hardware or computer software at his discretion. We find this interpretation of “request” to be strained. Gagnon did not create the programs on his own initiative and market them to AMS; rather, he created them in response to AMS’s requests. Moreover, after prototype software was developed, he made changes to the programs in response to Akerstein and other AMS employees’ requests. No genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether AMS requested the programs.

2. Gagnon Created the Software for AMS and Delivered It

[20] Though Gagnon argues that the programs could be converted for use by another company, Gagnon admitted that the programs were created specifically for AMS and that AMS paid for the work related to drafting of the programs as well as some related costs. It is, therefore, undisputed that Gagnon created these programs for AMS.

[21] The remaining question is whether Gagnon delivered the programs to AMS. We agree with the district court that Gagnon delivered them when he installed them onto the AMS computers and stored the source code on-site at AMS. Gagnon argues that even if he had installed the programs onto the AMS computers, he never delivered the source code so that AMS could modify the code. If AMS did not have the right to modify the code, it may have infringed Gagnon’s copyright by exceeding the scope of its license. Gagnon primarily points to AMS’s inability to locate the code on its own computer systems after his services were terminated to show that AMS did not possess the code. But, as we explain below, Gagnon’s conduct manifested an objective intent to give AMS an unlimited license at the time of creation; thus, when he stored the source code at AMS, the code was delivered.

3. Gagnon’s Intent as Manifested by His Conduct

[22] Gagnon argues that he never intended that AMS would retain and modify the programs he delivered. Gagnon misunderstands the inquiry into intent, and we conclude that his conduct did manifest an intent to grant a license. The relevant intent is the licensor’s objective intent at the time of the creation and delivery of the software as manifested by the parties’ conduct...

[23] Gagnon and AMS had an ongoing service relationship in which Gagnon provided technical support for all computer-related problems at AMS; he also created certain custom software applications at AMS’s request. The relationship of the parties indicates neither an intent to grant nor deny a license without Gagnon’s future involvement.

[24] Several documents exist, however, that reflect the parties’ objective intent: the TSA, signed by both parties, the OVA submitted by Gagnon, and Gagnon’s letter objecting to Akerstein’s proposed changes to the OVA. Courts have looked to contracts, even if unexecuted, as evidence of the intent of the party submitting the contract.

[25] The TSA, signed by both parties in 2000 and printed on Mister Computer letterhead, stated only that Gagnon “will provide” AMS “specific add-on products.” Nothing in the TSA indicates Gagnon’s understanding or intent that continued use of the custom application programming undertaken by Gagnon would be prohibited after the TSA terminated. The TSA also provided that AMS would be billed for Gagnon’s services at

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6 We do not consider the NDA, allegedly signed by Gagnon, because Gagnon contests its validity and argues that his signature was forged, creating a factual dispute inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment.
an hourly rate. Gagnon was well paid for his services. Under the circumstances, it defies logic that AMS would have paid Gagnon for his programming services if AMS could not have used the programs without further payment pursuant to a separate licensing arrangement that was never mentioned in the TSA, and never otherwise requested at the time. This is especially so because custom software is far less valuable without the ability to modify it and because the TSA was set to expire in one year; one would expect some indication of the need for future licensing if the custom programs were to become unusable after the TSA expired.

[26] The OVA submitted by Gagnon, but never executed, did not evidence any intent by Gagnon to limit AMS’s use of the programs. Gagnon argues that the clause, “Client agrees that [intellectual property] produced by Contractor while performing services under this agreement will be the property of Contractor and will be licensed to Client on a non-exclusive basis as will any copyrights, patents, or trademarks obtained by Contractor while performing services under this agreement ...,” means that his license was conditioned on a continuing relationship with AMS. We disagree. The clause “while performing services under this agreement” modifies the production of the intellectual property and the obtainment of copyrights. Furthermore, the contract then expressly stated, “Contractor will allow Company non-exclusive, unlimited licensing of software developed for Company,” eliminating any ambiguity.

[27] Moreover, Gagnon and AMS did not discuss a licensing agreement until their relationship was ending. Gagnon delivered the software without any caveats or limitations on AMS’s use of the programs. Even if Gagnon and his employees maintained the software and had primary control over the code, they programmed on-site at AMS on AMS computers to which key AMS personnel had access—conduct that does not demonstrate an intent to retain sole control. The first time Gagnon expressed a contrary intent was in his letter to Akers[tein] after AMS had decided to terminate Gagnon’s services.

[28] Finally, the splash screens containing the copyright notice do not negate AMS’s license to use the product. The splash screens speak to Gagnon’s intent to retain copyright ownership over the programs, not to his intent to grant or not grant a license as would be his right as the copyright owner.

[29] Gagnon had to express an intent to retain control over the programs and limit AMS’s license if he intended to do so. A belated statement that the programs could not be used after Gagnon’s departure, made after the termination decision and well after the creation and delivery of the programs for which substantial sums were paid, was not sufficient to negate all other objective manifestations of intent to grant AMS an unlimited license.

4. Scope and Irrevocability of Implied License

[30] For the reasons outlined, we hold that Gagnon granted AMS an unlimited, nonexclusive license to retain, use, and modify the software. Furthermore, because AMS paid consideration, this license is irrevocable. A nonexclusive license supported by consideration is a contract. If an implied license accompanied by consideration were revocable at will, the contract would be illusory.

[31] We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim....

NOTES

1. Some courts emphasize that the three factors set out in Asset Marketing Systems are not necessarily the only relevant ones to consider whether there is an implied license. For example, the Fifth Circuit has stated that an implied license might “arise in other circumstances where the totality of the parties’ conduct supported such an outcome.” Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2012). Are there other factors you think might be relevant to inferring a nonexclusive license?
2. Christopher Newman has explained that “a license is not a contractual obligation assumed by a licensor, but rather a form of limited property interest granted by one, as an exercise of one of the powers of title.” Christopher M. Newman, “What Exactly Are You Implying?: The Elusive Nature of the Implied Copyright License,” 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 502 (2014). In light of this understanding, Newman argues that notions from property law are more suitable to making sense of implied licenses to copyrighted material than are principles from contract law:

The law of implied copyright licenses presents something of an explanatory challenge for this approach. If licenses are an exercise of the owner’s power, how can they arise in circumstances where the owner made no effort to exercise it? In addition, there are clearly circumstances in which we think implied licenses should be irrevocable, and yet property formalities generally require a written grant to achieve this result. Does this mean that implied licenses, which by definition are not reduced to writing, must be contracts after all? Or perhaps that some of them are, while others are something else? … Consistent application of a property framework does a better job of rationalizing this area of law than the courts’ various halfhearted invocations of contract law.

Newman goes on to situate implied copyright licenses “not in contract doctrine, but in the implied consent that is recognized as providing a defense to property and other torts.” See also Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not to Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101 (2013).

3. When a nonexclusive license is implied, can it be terminated under copyright law as per the termination provisions you studied in Chapter IV? The Eleventh Circuit has said that such a license can be terminated. Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999). The court reasoned that “[t]he plain language of section 203 covers all nonexclusive grants of a license that are executed after the specified date, and nothing in the statute excludes those that are implied.”

Given that the duration of contracts or licenses over copyrights can be lengthy due to the length of the copyright term, these agreements often must be interpreted long after they were first drafted and executed. In the period between the drafting and later interpretation of an agreement, technologies of distribution and the forms that works take might have changed in important ways.

As you read the following two cases, consider the tools the courts deploy to interpret the parties’ agreements. In each case, which party gets the benefit of the new use at issue? Is that a sensible result as a matter of copyright policy? As a matter of contract interpretation?

Margret Rey v. Richard G.D. Lafferty
990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993)

CYR, J.: …

I – BACKGROUND

[1] “Curious George” is an imaginary monkey whose antics are chronicled in seven books, written by Margret and H.A. Rey, which have entertained readers since the 1940s. A mischievous personality consistently lands
Curious George in amusing scrapes and predicaments. The more recent “monkey business”—leading to the present litigation—began in 1977 when Margret Rey granted Milktrain Productions an option to produce and televise 104 animated “Curious George” film episodes. The option agreement was contingent on Milktrain’s obtaining financing for the film project.

A. The Original Film Agreements.

[2] Milktrain approached LHP, a Canadian investment firm, to obtain financing for the project. LHP agreed to fund the venture by selling shares in the project to investors (hereinafter: the “Milktrain Agreement”); LHP and its investors were to divide a 50% share of Milktrain’s profits on the films and on any future ancillary products.

[3] With the financing commitment in place, Rey granted Milktrain and LHP a limited license “to produce (within a two-year period from the date of exercise) one hundred and four (104) four minute film episodes based on the [Curious George] character solely for broadcast on television” (hereinafter: the “Rey License”). Rey was to receive a fee for assisting with the editing and production of the episodes, and an additional royalty amounting to 10% of the revenues from any film telecasts.

B. The Revised Agreements.

[4] The film project soon encountered delays and financial setbacks. By early 1979, though only 32 of the 104 episodes had been completed, the original investment funds had been virtually exhausted. In order to rescue the project and complete the films to Rey’s satisfaction, LHP offered to arrange additional financing. In consideration, LHP insisted that the Milktrain Agreement be revised to permit LHP to assume control of the film production process and to receive higher royalties on the completed episodes. Milktrain assented to these revisions, and the revised Milktrain Agreement (hereinafter: the “RMA”) was signed on November 5, 1979.

[5] As prelude to its description of the new obligations between Milktrain and LHP, the RMA recited that Milktrain and LHP owned “the rights to Curious George which have been obtained from ... Rey” under the Rey License. The RMA further stated that:

Investors acquiring the episodes shall acquire all right, title and interest therein, without limitation or reserve, including the original negative.

[6] On November 5, 1979, concurrently with the execution of the Revised Milktrain Agreement, a revised version of the Rey License (hereinafter: the “RRL”) was executed, incorporating these changes, and superseding the original Rey License. The RRL recited that the original Rey License had granted Milktrain and LHP the right to produce and distribute animated “Curious George” films “for television viewing”.

C. The Ancillary Products Agreement.

[7] Production of the 104 TV episodes was completed in 1982. On January 3, 1983, an Ancillary Products Agreement (or “APA”) was signed by Rey and LHP, granting LHP a general right to license “Curious George” in spin-off (“ancillary”) products for a renewable term of five years. The APA defined “ancillary products” as:

All tangible goods ... excluding books, films, tapes, records, or video productions.... However, for stories already owned by [LHP] and which have been produced as 104 episodes under the license granted in the January, 1978 agreement and the November 5, 1979 revision of that agreement, [LHP] shall have the right to produce books, films, tapes, records and video
productions of these episodes under this Agreement, subject to [Rey's] prior approval ... which prior approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.

[8] In return for these rights, Rey was to receive one-third of the royalties on the licensed products, with certain minimum annual payments guaranteed. Rey retained the right to disapprove any product, and to propose changes which would make a disapproved product acceptable to her. The APA provided, inter alia, that Rey's approval would not be withheld "unreasonably." ...

[9] Following the execution of the Ancillary Products Agreement, LHP assigned its licensing rights to a new subsidiary, Curgeo Enterprises, which turned its attention to licensing the "Curious George" character in various product forms....

E. Other Product Licenses.

[10] ... Beginning in 1983, the "Curious George" TV episodes were licensed to Sony Corporation, which transferred the images from the television film negatives to videotape. LHP takes the position that the Sony video license was entered pursuant to the RRL; Rey claims it is subject to the APA....

F. The Ancillary Products Agreement Renewal.

[11] ... LHP earned less money than it anticipated from ancillary products. When the APA came up for renewal in January 1988, LHP declined to exercise its option for an additional five-year term. Instead, the parties agreed to renew on a month-to-month basis, terminable by either party on one month's notice. Rey's royalty rate was increased to 50% (effective January 3, 1988), but with no guaranteed minimum payment. On April 10, 1989, Rey terminated the APA. LHP responded by advising that Curgeo would "continue to administer those licenses which [remained] outstanding and report to you from time to time accordingly." LHP thereupon continued to market the Sony videos ....

G. "Curious George" Goes to Court.

[12] On February 8, 1991, Rey filed suit against Lafferty, Curgeo and LHP, in connection with LHP's continuing, allegedly unauthorized production of ... Sony videos. Rey's complaint alleged violations of federal copyright ... [and] breach of contract ...; it sought to enjoin further violations and to recover unpaid royalties on the ... videos....

[13] After a four-day bench trial, the district court found for Rey on her claims for breach of contract, ruling that the ... video licenses were governed by the APA and that Rey was entitled to recover $256,327 in royalties....

II – DISCUSSION ...

A. The ... Video Claims.

[14] The Rey complaint alleged that LHP's only right to publish the "Curious George" TV episodes in ... video form derived from the Ancillary Products Agreement, was subject to the APA's royalty provisions, and expired when Rey terminated the APA in 1989. LHP responds that the ... video rights to the TV episodes were governed by the parties' other agreements, specifically the Revised Rey License, which (according to LHP) incorporated the Revised Milktrain Agreement. According to LHP, these other agreements continued in effect notwithstanding termination of the APA; moreover, these agreements provided that no royalties were due Rey before LHP's investors recovered their investment in the 104 TV films. The district court accepted the
interpretation urged by Rey, based on the language of the various contracts and the circumstances surrounding their execution. We agree....

[15] LHP's claim to the Sony video royalties is ... complicated: assuming the videos were not covered by the contractual clause in the RMA [as discussed in an omitted part of the opinion], might they nonetheless have been covered by the grant of rights in the RRL, which licensed LHP to produce the 104 episodes “for television viewing”? The district court thought not: the parties’ “reference to television viewing ... in a licensing agreement ... does not include [video technology] ... which probably was not in existence at the time that the rights were given.”

a. “New Uses” and Copyright Law.

[16] For purposes of the present appeal, we accept the uncontested district court finding that the relevant video technology “was not in existence at the time that the rights” were granted under the RRL in January 1979. Consequently, it must be inferred that the parties did not specifically contemplate television “viewing” of the “Curious George” films in videocassette form at the time the RRL was signed. Such absence of specific intent typifies cases which address “new uses” of licensed materials, i.e., novel technological developments which generate unforeseen applications for a previously licensed work.

[17] Normally, in such situations, the courts have sought at the outset to identify any indicia of a mutual general intent to apportion rights to “new uses,” insofar as such general intent can be discerned from the language of the license, the surrounding circumstances, and trade usage. See, e.g., Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 112 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1940) (grant of “complete and entire” motion picture rights to licensed work held to encompass later-developed sound motion picture technology); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 446 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (author’s explicit retention of “all” television rights to licensed work, in grant of motion picture rights predating technological advances permitting movies to be shown on television, included retention of right to show motion picture on television). Where no reliable indicia of general intent are discernible, however, courts have resorted to one of several interpretive methods to resolve the issue on policy grounds.

[18] Under the preferred method, ... the court will conclude, absent contrary indicia of the parties’ intent, that the licensee may properly pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in the license. Under this interpretive method, the courts will presume that at least the possibility of nonspecific “new uses” was foreseeable by the contracting parties at the time the licensing agreement was drafted; accordingly, the burden and risk of drafting licenses whose language anticipates the possibility of any particular “new use” are apportioned equally between licensor and licensee.

[19] An alternative interpretive method is to assume that a license of rights in a given medium (e.g., “motion picture rights”) includes only such uses as fall within the unambiguous core meaning of the term ... and excludes any uses which lie within the ambiguous penumbra (e.g., exhibition of motion picture film on television). Thus any rights not expressly (in this case meaning unambiguously) granted are reserved.

[20] This method is intended to prevent licensees from reaping the entire windfall associated with the new medium, and is particularly appropriate in situations which involve overreaching or exploitation of unequal bargaining power by a licensee in negotiating the contract. It may also be appropriate where a particular “new use” was completely unforeseeable and therefore could not possibly have formed part of the bargain between the parties at the time of the original grant. Obviously, this method may be less appropriate in arm’s-length transactions between sophisticated parties involving foreseeable technological developments; in such situations, narrow construction of license grants may afford an unjustifiable windfall to the licensor, who
would retain blanket rights to analogous “new uses” of copyright material notwithstanding the breadth of the bargained-for grant.7

b. Video Technology as “New Use”.

[21] These fine-tuned interpretive methods have led to divergent results in cases considering the extension of television rights to new video forms. Thus, for example, in Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 714 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1982), the court determined that a series of contracts granting motion picture distributors a general license to exhibit plaintiffs’ films “by any present or future methods or means” and “by any means now known or unknown” fairly encompassed the right to distribute the films by means of later-developed video technology. The contracts in question gave defendants extremely broad rights in the distribution and exhibition of pre-1960 films, plainly intending that such rights would be without limitation unless otherwise specified and further indicating that future technological advances in methods of reproduction, transmission and exhibition would inure to the benefit of defendants.

[22] By contrast, in Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 1969 contract granting rights to “[t]he exhibition of [a] motion picture [containing a licensed work] ... by means of television,” but containing a broad restriction reserving to the licensor “all rights and uses in and to said musical composition, except those herein granted,” did not encompass the right to revenues derived from sales of the film in videocassette form. After deciding that the general tenor of the contract section in which the granting clause was found contemplated some sort of broadcasting or centralized distribution, not distribution by sale or rental of individual copies to the general public, the court stressed that the playing of videocassettes, with their greater viewer control and decentralized access on an individual basis, did not constitute “exhibition” in the sense contemplated by the contract.

.... Television and videocassette display ... have very little in common besides the fact that a conventional monitor of a television set may be used both to receive television signals and to exhibit a videocassette. It is in light of this fact that Paramount argues that VCRs are equivalent to “exhibition by means of television.” Yet, even that assertion is flawed. Playing a videocassette on a VCR does not require a standard television set capable of receiving television signals by cable or by broadcast; it is only necessary to have a monitor capable of displaying the material on the magnetized tape....

c. Video Rights and the RRL.

[23] Although the question is extremely close, under the interpretive methodology outlined above we conclude that the RRL’s grant of rights to the 104 film episodes “for television viewing” did not encompass the right to distribute the “Curious George” films in videocassette form.

[24] First, unlike the contract[] in Rooney ..., the RRL contained no general grant of rights in technologies yet to be developed, and no explicit reference to “future methods” of exhibition. Rather, the RRL appears to contemplate a comparatively limited and particular grant of rights, encompassing only the 104 film episodes and leaving future uses of “Curious George” to later negotiation in the ancillary products agreement. Although the RRL conversely contains no specific limiting language, we believe such limitation is reasonably

7 The problem becomes particularly acute when the analogous technology develops so rapidly as to supplant the originally contemplated application of the licensed work, rendering the parties’ original bargain obsolete. Thus, for example, broad grants of “motion picture rights,” made before technological advances permitted the combination of moving images with sound, later were held, typically, to encompass the rights to sound motion picture technology; a narrower holding would have left the original license virtually worthless, despite its broad language, and would have provided the licensor with an undeserved windfall.
inferable from the situation of the parties and the general tenor of the section in which the “television viewing” rights were granted.

[25] Second, “television viewing” and “videocassette viewing” are not coextensive terms. Even though videocassettes may be, and often are, viewed by means of VCRs on home television screens, still, ... a standard television set capable of receiving television signals is not strictly required for videocassette viewing. It is only necessary to have a monitor capable of displaying the material on the magnetized tape. Indeed, a number of non-television monitors recently marketed in the United States permit videocassette viewing on computer screens, flat-panel displays, and the like. Thus, we find insufficient reliable indicia of a contrary mutual intent on the part of Rey and LHP to warrant disturbing the district court’s implicit determination that the language of the RRL is not broad enough to cover the new use.

[26] Finally, any lingering concerns about the correctness of the district court’s interpretation are dispelled by the evidence that the RRL (including its “television viewing” clause) was drafted and proposed by LHP, a professional investment firm accustomed to licensing agreements. Rey, an elderly woman, does not appear to have participated in its drafting, and, indeed, does not appear to have been represented by counsel during the larger part of the transaction. Under these circumstances, ... ambiguities in the drafting instrument are traditionally construed against the licensor and the drafter.

[27] Accordingly, as the Sony videocassette sales were not encompassed by the RRL, but governed exclusively by the APA, we find no conflict between the terms of the documents, and we affirm the award of royalties to Rey under the APA.

NOTE

1. Is it possible to ascertain the parties’ intent in an agreement as to new use of a work? If not, does copyright policy dictate an outcome that is preferable? If that result is at odds with general rules of contract interpretation, is there something to be said in favor of a federal common law of contract interpretation for copyright agreements? For a discussion about the federal underpinnings of copyright licenses and contracts, see Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1999).

B. Modifying Copyright Law by Contract

In this section, we address what happens when people agree, via contract or license, to not engage in behavior that copyright law permits them to do, such as fair use of a copyrighted work. Should the law enforce those agreements?

There are two quite different situations in which this issue arises, both regarding mass user licenses to a copyrighted work. The first is with regard to mass-marketed copyrighted material—typically, software products, but more recently other types of digital content as well. Many of these products contain end-user license agreements—typically in the form of shrink-wrap, click-wrap, or browse-wrap—that forbid users from engaging in a variety of practices, some of which would be permissible under the Copyright Act.

In the past two decades, a second form of mass user license agreement has emerged by which authors seek to ensure the public availability of their works on terms that they set. Creative Commons licenses are the most well-known form of this so-called “copyleft” agreement for copyrighted works that are not software. The open-source licenses that you read about in Chapter II—such as the GNU General Public License and the Apache License—are common forms of this sort of agreement for software works.
Creative Commons is a project formed by a group of activists, academics, and content creators to give rightholders choices about how their works may be used that are meant to supplement the “all rights reserved” default of the formal copyright law. Creative Commons provides a variety of “some rights reserved” licenses, allowing licenses allowing free use with attribution, noncommercial use, use without the right to make derivative works, and use with the requirement that the user make freely usable any derivative work created using the original source material (referred to as the “share-alike” license, which is similar in purpose to the GNU General Public License). Creative Commons also provides a “no rights reserved” public domain dedication license, which provides a perpetual and unconditional license “for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the detriment of Affirmer’s heirs and successors.”

Why would an author want to use any of these Creative Commons licenses rather than merely announcing that their work is in the public domain? Can you see how the Creative Commons and open-source licenses grant freedoms to users by embracing copyright law—which is typically conceptualized as restricting rather than actuating user freedoms?

As you read the following case involving a shrink-wrap license to software, consider how each party would like to characterize the transfers of software copies that have occurred and what the implications of each position are for copyright law. What test does the court use to evaluate how to characterize the transfers of software copies?

**Timothy S. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.**

621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010)

CALLAHAN, J.: ...

I. Autodesk’s Release 14 software and licensing practices

[1] .... Autodesk makes computer-aided design software used by architects, engineers, and manufacturers. It holds registered copyrights in all versions of the software including the discontinued Release 14 version, which is at issue in this case. It provided Release 14 to customers on CD-ROMs.

[2] Since at least 1986, Autodesk has offered AutoCAD to customers pursuant to an accompanying software license agreement ("SLA"), which customers must accept before installing the software. A customer who does not accept the SLA can return the software for a full refund. Autodesk offers SLAs with different terms for commercial, educational institution, and student users. The commercial license, which is the most expensive, imposes the fewest restrictions on users and allows them software upgrades at discounted prices.

[3] The SLA for Release 14 first recites that Autodesk retains title to all copies. Second, it states that the customer has a nonexclusive and nontransferable license to use Release 14. Third, it imposes transfer restrictions, prohibiting customers from renting, leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk’s prior consent and from electronically or physically transferring the software out of the Western Hemisphere. Fourth, it imposes significant use restrictions:
YOU MAY NOT: (1) modify, translate, reverse-engineer, decompile, or disassemble the Software ... (3) remove any proprietary notices, labels, or marks from the Software or Documentation; (4) use ... the Software outside of the Western Hemisphere; (5) utilize any computer software or hardware designed to defeat any hardware copy-protection device, should the software you have licensed be equipped with such protection; or (6) use the Software for commercial or other revenue-generating purposes if the Software has been licensed or labeled for educational use only.

[4] Fifth, the SLA provides for license termination if the user copies the software without authorization or does not comply with the SLA’s restrictions. Finally, the SLA provides that if the software is an upgrade of a previous version:

[You must destroy the software previously licensed to you, including any copies resident on
your hard disk drive ... within sixty (60) days of the purchase of the license to use the upgrade or
update.... Autodesk reserves the right to require you to show satisfactory proof that previous
copies of the software have been destroyed.]

[5] Autodesk takes measures to enforce these license requirements. It assigns a serial number to each copy of AutoCAD and tracks registered licensees. It requires customers to input “activation codes” within one month after installation to continue using the software. The customer obtains the code by providing the product’s serial number to Autodesk. Autodesk issues the activation code after confirming that the serial number is authentic, the copy is not registered to a different customer, and the product has not been upgraded. Once a customer has an activation code, he or she may use it to activate the software on additional computers without notifying Autodesk.

B. Autodesk’s provision of Release 14 software to CTA

[6] In March 1999, Autodesk reached a settlement agreement with its customer Cardwell/Thomas & Associates, Inc. (“CTA”), which Autodesk had accused of unauthorized use of its software. As part of the settlement, Autodesk licensed ten copies of Release 14 to CTA. CTA agreed to the SLA, which appeared (1) on each Release 14 package that Autodesk provided to CTA; (2) in the settlement agreement; and (3) on-screen, while the software is being installed.

[7] CTA later upgraded to the newer, fifteenth version of the AutoCAD program, AutoCAD 2000. It paid $495 per upgrade license, compared to $3,750 for each new license. The SLA for AutoCAD 2000, like the SLA for Release 14, required destruction of copies of previous versions of the software, with proof to be furnished to Autodesk on request. However, rather than destroying its Release 14 copies, CTA sold them to [Timothy] Vernor at an office sale with the handwritten activation codes necessary to use the software.

C. Vernor’s eBay business and sales of Release 14

[8] .... In May 2005, [Vernor] purchased an authentic used copy of Release 14 at a garage sale from an unspecified seller. He never agreed to the SLA’s terms, opened a sealed software packet, or installed the Release 14 software. Though he was aware of the SLA’s existence, he believed that he was not bound by its terms. He posted the software copy for sale on eBay.

[9] Autodesk filed a Digital Millennium Copyright Act take-down notice with eBay claiming that Vernor’s sale infringed its copyright, and eBay terminated Vernor’s auction. Autodesk advised Vernor that it conveyed its software copies pursuant to non-transferable licenses, and resale of its software was copyright infringement. Vernor filed a DMCA counter-notice with eBay contesting the validity of Autodesk’s copyright claim.
Autodesk did not respond to the counter-notice. eBay reinstated the auction, and Vernor sold the software to another eBay user.

In April 2007, Vernor purchased four authentic used copies of Release 14 at CTA’s office sale. The authorization codes were handwritten on the outside of the box. He listed the four copies on eBay sequentially, representing, “This software is not currently installed on any computer.” On each of the first three occasions, the same DMCA process ensued. Autodesk filed a DMCA take-down notice with eBay, and eBay removed Vernor’s auction. Vernor submitted a counter-notice to which Autodesk did not respond, and eBay reinstated the auction.

When Vernor listed his fourth, final copy of Release 14, Autodesk again filed a DMCA take-down notice with eBay. This time, eBay suspended Vernor’s account because of Autodesk’s repeated charges of infringement. Vernor also wrote to Autodesk, claiming that he was entitled to sell his Release 14 copies pursuant to the first sale doctrine, because he never installed the software or agreed to the SLA. In response, Autodesk’s counsel directed Vernor to stop selling the software. Vernor filed a final counter-notice with eBay. When Autodesk again did not respond to Vernor’s counter-notice, eBay reinstated Vernor’s account. At that point, Vernor’s eBay account had been suspended for one month, during which he was unable to earn income on eBay.

Vernor currently has two additional copies of Release 14 that he wishes to sell on eBay. Although the record is not clear, it appears that Vernor sold two of the software packages that he purchased from CTA, for roughly $600 each, but did not sell the final two to avoid risking further suspension of his eBay account.

II.

In August 2007, Vernor brought a declaratory action against Autodesk to establish that his resales of used Release 14 software are protected by the first sale doctrine and do not infringe Autodesk’s copyright....

III. ...

This case requires us to decide whether Autodesk sold Release 14 copies to its customers or licensed the copies to its customers. If CTA owned its copies of Release 14, then both its sales to Vernor and Vernor’s subsequent sales were non-infringing under the first sale doctrine. However, if Autodesk only licensed CTA to use copies of Release 14, then CTA’s and Vernor’s sales of those copies are not protected by the first sale doctrine and would therefore infringe Autodesk’s exclusive distribution right.

A. The first sale doctrine ...

In its current form, [the first-sale doctrine] allows the “owner of a particular copy” of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his copy without the copyright owner’s authorization. The first sale doctrine does not apply to a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as a licensee. See id. § 109(d)....

If Autodesk’s transfer of Release 14 copies to CTA was a first sale, then CTA’s resale of the software in violation of the SLA’s terms would be a breach of contract, but would not result in copyright liability. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he exclusive right to vend the transferred copy rests with the vendee, who is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy, even though in breach of an agreement restricting its sale.”).
IV. ...

[16] We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions. Applying our holding to Autodesk's SLA, we conclude that CTA was a licensee rather than an owner of copies of Release 14 and thus was not entitled to invoke the first sale doctrine or the essential step defense.

[17] Autodesk retained title to the software and imposed significant transfer restrictions: it stated that the license is nontransferable, the software could not be transferred or leased without Autodesk's written consent, and the software could not be transferred outside the Western Hemisphere. The SLA also imposed use restrictions against the use of the software outside the Western Hemisphere and against modifying, translating, or reverse-engineering the software, removing any proprietary marks from the software or documentation, or defeating any copy protection device. Furthermore, the SLA provided for termination of the license upon the licensee's unauthorized copying or failure to comply with other license restrictions. Thus, because Autodesk reserved title to Release 14 copies and imposed significant transfer and use restrictions, we conclude that its customers are licensees of their copies of Release 14 rather than owners.

[18] CTA was a licensee rather than an "owner of a particular copy" of Release 14, and it was not entitled to resell its Release 14 copies to Vernor under the first sale doctrine. Therefore, Vernor did not receive title to the copies from CTA and accordingly could not pass ownership on to others. Both CTA's and Vernor's sales infringed Autodesk's exclusive right to distribute copies of its work.

[19] Because Vernor was not an owner, his customers are also not owners of Release 14 copies. Therefore, when they install Release 14 on their computers, the copies of the software that they make during installation infringe Autodesk's exclusive reproduction right because they too are not entitled to the benefit of the essential step defense. 13 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 117(a)(1) ....

[20] ... Vernor contends that "economic realities" demonstrate that Autodesk makes "first sales" to its customers, because Autodesk allows its customers to possess their copies of the software indefinitely and does not require recurring license payments. We held supra that neither of these factors is dispositive. Vernor cites no first sale doctrine case in support of this proposition....

V.

[21] Although our holding today is controlled by our precedent, we recognize the significant policy considerations raised by the parties and amici on both sides of this appeal.

[22] Autodesk, the Software & Information Industry Association ("SIIA"), and the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") have presented policy arguments that favor our result. For instance, Autodesk argues in favor of judicial enforcement of software license agreements that restrict transfers of copies of the work. Autodesk contends that this (1) allows for tiered pricing for different software markets, such as reduced pricing for students or educational institutions; (2) increases software companies' sales; (3) lowers prices for all consumers by spreading costs among a large number of purchasers; and (4) reduces the incidence of piracy by allowing copyright owners to bring infringement actions against unauthorized resellers. SIIA argues that a

13 It may seem intuitive that every lawful user of a copyrighted software program, whether they own their copies or are merely licensed to use them, should be entitled to an "essential step defense" that provides that they do not infringe simply by using a computer program that they lawfully acquired. However, the Copyright Act confines this defense only on owners of software copies. See 17 U.S.C. § 117. In contrast, a licensee's right to use the software, including the right to copy the software into RAM, is conferred by the terms of its license agreement.
license can exist even where a customer (1) receives his copy of the work after making a single payment and (2) can indefinitely possess a software copy, because it is the software code and associated rights that are valuable rather than the inexpensive discs on which the code may be stored. Also, the MPAA argues that a customer’s ability to possess a copyrighted work indefinitely should not compel a finding of a first sale, because there is often no practically feasible way for a consumer to return a copy to the copyright owner.

[23] Vernor, eBay, and the American Library Association (“ALA”) have presented policy arguments against our decision. Vernor contends that our decision (1) does not vindicate the law’s aversion to restraints on alienation of personal property; (2) may force everyone purchasing copyrighted property to trace the chain of title to ensure that a first sale occurred; and (3) ignores the economic realities of the relevant transactions, in which the copyright owner permanently released software copies into the stream of commerce without expectation of return in exchange for upfront payment of the full software price. eBay contends that a broad view of the first sale doctrine is necessary to facilitate the creation of secondary markets for copyrighted works, which contributes to the public good by (1) giving consumers additional opportunities to purchase and sell copyrighted works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to obtain copies of works after a copyright owner has ceased distribution; and (3) allowing the proliferation of businesses.

[24] The ALA contends that the first sale doctrine facilitates the availability of copyrighted works after their commercial lifespan, by inter alia enabling the existence of libraries, used bookstores, and hand-to-hand exchanges of copyrighted materials. The ALA further contends that judicial enforcement of software license agreements, which are often contracts of adhesion, could eliminate the software resale market, require used computer sellers to delete legitimate software prior to sale, and increase prices for consumers by reducing price competition for software vendors. It contends that Autodesk’s position (1) undermines 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), which permits non-profit libraries to lend software for non-commercial purposes, and (2) would hamper efforts by non-profits to collect and preserve out-of-print software. The ALA fears that the software industry’s licensing practices could be adopted by other copyright owners, including book publishers, record labels, and movie studios.

[25] These are serious contentions on both sides, but they do not alter our conclusion that our precedent … requires the result we reach. Congress is free, of course, to modify the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense if it deems these or other policy considerations to require a different approach…. 

NOTES

1. Reflect on the policy considerations in favor of labeling the transfers here as a license and those in favor of labeling them as a sale. Does copyright policy clearly favor one of these positions over the other? For reflections on this question, see Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211 (2015). How do you weigh the importance of maintaining a broadly applicable first-sale doctrine against the importance of respecting contractual agreements that might seek to limit it?

2. Shortly after Vernor, the Ninth Circuit issued another ruling on whether to understand a transfer of copies as a license or a sale of those copies, but this time concluded that the transfer was a sale. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). In this case, UMG Recordings, one of the world’s largest music companies, would ship[] specially-produced promotional CDs to a large group of individuals, such as music critics and radio programmers, that it has selected. There is no prior agreement or request by the recipients to receive the CDs. UMG does not seek or receive payment for the CDs, the content and design of which often differs from that of their commercial counterparts…. Relatively few
of the recipients refuse delivery of the CDs or return them to UMG, and UMG destroys those
that are returned.

Most of these CDs bore a statement like the following:

This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the intended recipient for
personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an agreement to comply with the
terms of the license. Resale or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable
under federal and state laws.

Defendant Troy Augusto was not a direct recipient of promotional CDs from UMG, but he was able to acquire
some of these CDs, which he sold on eBay. UMG sued Augusto for copyright infringement, particularly for
violating its exclusive right to distribute the CDs, which UMG argued it retained because the CDs had only
been licensed, not sold, to their recipients.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling that UMG had effected a sale by distributing the CDs to the original
recipients. The court reasoned:

Our conclusion that the recipients acquired ownership of the CDs is based largely on the nature
of UMG’s distribution. First, the promotional CDs are dispatched to the recipients without any
prior arrangement as to those particular copies. The CDs are not numbered, and no attempt is
made to keep track of where particular copies are or what use is made of them.... Although
UMG places written restrictions in the labels of the CDs, it has not established that the
restrictions on the CDs create a license agreement....

Because the record here is devoid of any indication that the recipients agreed to a license, there
is no evidence to support a conclusion that licenses were established under the terms of the
promotional statement. Accordingly, we conclude that UMG’s transfer of possession to the
recipients, without meaningful control or even knowledge of the status of the CDs after
shipment, accomplished a transfer of title.

Given that there was a first sale, the recipients and later Augusto were entitled—pursuant to the first-sale
doctrine—to dispose of the CDs as they saw fit.
Great Minds v. FedEx Office & Print Services, Inc.
886 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2018)

CARNEY, J.:

BACKGROUND

[1] Great Minds is a non-profit organization that designs educational materials. These include a copyrighted curriculum called “Eureka Math.” Great Minds sells the Materials in book form and also releases them to the public without charge but subject to a “public license,” using a template that is made available by a group called Creative Commons. The License allows “[a]ny member of the public [to] download, reproduce, and distribute [the Materials] pursuant to the terms of the [] License, which is made available to all on the same terms without the need to negotiate.”

[2] The License provides that “[e]very recipient of the [Materials] automatically receives an offer from the Licensor to exercise the Licensed Rights under the terms and conditions of this [] License,” and grants each “individual or entity exercising the Licensed Rights” what it describes as a “worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to ... reproduce and Share the [Materials], in whole or in part, for NonCommercial purposes only.” It defines “NonCommercial purposes” to mean purposes “not primarily intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or monetary compensation.”

[3] In the complaint, Great Minds characterizes these provisions as amounting to an “explicit limitation of the License to noncommercial use requir[ing] that commercial print shops ... negotiate a license and pay a royalty to Great Minds if they wish to reproduce the Materials ... at the request of their [paying] customers.” Great Minds incidentally avers that it uses the revenue that it receives from royalties and direct sales to fund the development of new curricular materials.

[4] In late 2015 and early 2016, Great Minds discovered that FedEx stores in Michigan and New York reproduced the Materials, without Great Minds’ authorization, in the course of their ordinary, for-profit business. After each such discovery, Great Minds sent a letter to FedEx demanding that FedEx either negotiate a royalty-bearing license with it or cease commercial reproduction of the Materials. FedEx refused, arguing that it had permissibly reproduced the Materials at the request of school districts, which sought to use the Materials for noncommercial purposes under the License.

[5] Great Minds filed the instant lawsuit in March 2016, asserting a single claim of copyright infringement against FedEx. The District Court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that the unambiguous terms of the License permit FedEx to provide for-profit copying services on behalf of a school district exercising noncommercial use rights under the License.

DISCUSSION

[6] FedEx concedes that its copying services are commercial in nature, and that its reproduction of the Materials would therefore be impermissible under the License if FedEx were acting as a direct licensee. Great Minds used the “Creative Commons Attribution—Non Commercial—Share Alike 4.0 International Public License,” which is available online at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/legalcode.
Minds, in turn, has not alleged that the school districts’ use of the Materials exceeded the scope of the License. The question we must answer is whether the License permits school districts to use FedEx’s services in furtherance of their own noncommercial use of the Materials under the License. On de novo review of the License, we find it silent on that point. We hold that, under long-established principles of agency law, a licensee under a non-exclusive copyright license may use third-party assistance in exercising its license rights unless the license expressly provides otherwise. We therefore affirm the District Court’s conclusion that FedEx did not infringe Great Minds’ copyright. FedEx reproduced the Materials at the direction of Great Minds’ authorized licensees, and nothing in the License prohibited the licensees from seeking FedEx’s services.

I. Legal standards

[7] .... To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege that the plaintiff owned a valid copyright and the defendant violated one of the exclusive rights that 17 U.S.C. § 106 bestows upon a copyright holder. A copyright owner waives the right to sue, however, for uses of copyrighted material that are authorized by a non-exclusive license.

[8] Copyright licenses are generally construed according to principles of contract law. In a dispute over the meaning of a contract, the threshold question is whether the contract is ambiguous, which is a question of law for the court. Under New York law, courts must consider how the contract would be understood by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business. If specific contract language is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, the contract is ambiguous as a matter of law.

II. Analysis

[9] On de novo review of the complaint, we identify no express License language that would either permit or prohibit licensees’ use of third-party services in furtherance of their authorized purposes. That silence does not produce an ambiguity, however. Applying well-established agency principles, we conclude that licensees may use third-party assistance in exercising their rights under non-exclusive copyright licenses unless the license clearly states otherwise.

A. The Text of the License

1. The Meaning of “reproduce and Share”

[10] The License authorizes licensees to “reproduce and Share” the Materials for noncommercial purposes. FedEx argues that, because the License defines “Share” to mean “provid[ing] material to the public by any means or process”—including “reproduction”—FedEx’s provision of commercial copying services falls within the licensee school districts’ right to “reproduce and Share” the Materials. This argument plucks out of context the operative License language, however. The License specifies more fully that Great Minds’ licensees may “Share” by “provid[ing] material to the public by any means or process that requires permission under the Licensed Rights.” (emphasis added) “Licensed Rights,” in turn, are “limited to all Copyright and Similar Rights ... that the Licensor has authority to license.” Thus, the term “Share” encompasses the various types of reproduction and dissemination activities that require permission from the copyright holder; it does not expressly describe a right to enlist the services of third parties in performing those activities.

2. The “downstream recipients” provision

[11] Great Minds agrees that, under the License, school districts may themselves “reproduce and Share” the Materials. It maintains, however, that the school districts’ authority to use commercial reproduction services
for the same purpose is limited by the License’s “downstream recipients” provision. Under that provision, “[e]very recipient of the [Materials] automatically receives an offer ... to exercise the Licensed Rights under the terms and conditions of this [ ] License.” In Great Minds’ view, FedEx was a “recipient” of the Materials that received an “offer” to exercise the Licensed Rights. It therefore acted as a licensee in its own right when it reproduced the Materials for profit, which violated the terms of the License and thereby made FedEx liable for copyright infringement.

[12] We find this argument unpersuasive. Great Minds fails to account for the mundane ubiquity of lawful agency relationships, in which “one person, to one degree or another ..., acts as a representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of another person.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. c (2006). The concept of an agency relationship is a sine qua non in the world of entities like corporations and public school districts, which have no concrete existence.... If a school district decides to incorporate Great Minds’ Materials into the standard curriculum, the teachers and administrative staff who receive, reproduce, and disseminate the Materials do so within the scope of their employment, as agents for the school district. They act as extensions of the school district, and therefore act pursuant to the school district’s license rights.

[13] Under Great Minds’ reading of the License, each teacher and administrator who handles the Materials is a “downstream recipient” who acts as an independent licensee, even if their use of the Materials is compelled by the terms of their employment. If a license were intended to achieve such a radical result, we would expect a clear statement in the license to that effect. Great Minds’ public license contains no such statement. We conclude, therefore, that the “downstream recipients” provision cannot reasonably be read to apply within the scope of employment relationships.

[14] By the same token, we conclude that Great Minds’ licensees may rely on non-employee agents in carrying out permitted uses without converting those agents into independent licensees. The License text provides no basis for distinguishing between a school that directs its employees to make copies on the school’s machines and a school that achieves an identical result by enlisting a temporary independent contractor—or a commercial duplication service....

[15] Great Minds could, if it wished, draft a public license that specified whether, and under what circumstances, a licensee may rely on employees or non-employee agents in reproducing or otherwise engaging with the Materials. But Great Minds included no such specification in the license at issue here. As written, the License cannot reasonably be read to convey any such intention.

3. The reservation of rights

[16] In a last gasp, Great Minds offers a final textual argument: the License “specifically reserves Great Minds’ right to collect royalties for all commercial uses,” and this phrase must be read to include the commercial reproduction services that FedEx provided to its school district clients. (emphasis added) We agree with the District Court’s reading, however, that “the unambiguous import of this provision is to reserve [Great Minds’] right to collect royalties from a licensee if the licensee exceeds the scope of the license by, for example, selling copies of the Materials.” Great Minds’ argument has little persuasive force, as it merely begs the question whether FedEx should properly be considered a licensee or an agent of the licensee school districts....

CONCLUSION

[17] In sum, Great Minds’ non-exclusive public license does not expressly preclude licensee school districts from engaging third parties, including commercial third parties, in furtherance of their rights under the License. Absent any such limitation, licensees may rely on services provided by third-party agents when exercising their license rights. We conclude that the License unambiguously permitted school districts to
engage FedEx, for a fee, to reproduce the Materials. Great Minds has therefore failed to state a plausible claim of copyright infringement against FedEx.

NOTE

1. Should it matter to the result here that Creative Commons expressed its view in an amicus brief it sought to file in this case that Great Minds was incorrect in its understanding of the Creative Commons license it was using? See https://creativecommons.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Great-Minds-Amicus-Brief.pdf. (The Second Circuit issued an order denying Creative Commons’ motion to file this amicus brief.)

C. Copyright Misuse

The cases you just read seem to suggest that copyright holders can limit all sorts of sub-uses of their copyrighted works, but can they upset the balance of copyright law using contracts or other mechanisms? In this section, we’ll discuss that question through the lens of the doctrine of copyright misuse and, in the next section, we’ll do the same with regard to preemption doctrine.

Copyright misuse is loosely analogous to the doctrine of patent misuse in patent law, where it is a “defense to infringement claims when a patentee uses its patent as the effective means of restraining competition[, such as] with its sale of an unpatented article.” Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 38 (2006). Construed generally, copyright misuse tends to be asserted as a defense to infringement when “copyright ... holders assert their rights, not to protect from market harm to their protected works, but to protect other aspects of their market by using the protected work.” Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 549, 565 (2015). More specifically, as Kathryn Judge explains, copyright misuse comes in two forms, one of which is closely linked to patent misuse:

Copyright misuse can arise in two different but related circumstances. The first type occurs when a copyright holder uses rights granted to him under the Copyright Act in a manner that violates federal antitrust law. The second type arises when a copyright holder attempts to extend his copyright beyond the scope of the exclusive rights granted by Congress in a manner that violates the public policy embodied in copyright law. However, the relationship between the two strands, and the degree to which competition policy underlies the public policy approach, has been a source of significant confusion.

Note, Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 903-04 (2004). Judge asserts that because of this confusion, copyright misuse as a doctrine has received a “mixed reception” in courts.
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc.
342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003)

AMBRO, J.: ...

BACKGROUND

[1] Video Pipeline compiles movie trailers onto videotape for home video retailers to display in their stores. To obtain the right to distribute the trailers used in the compilations, Video Pipeline enters into agreements with various entertainment companies. It entered into such an agreement, the Master Clip License Agreement, with Disney in 1988, and Disney thereafter provided Video Pipeline with over 500 trailers for its movies.

[2] In 1997, Video Pipeline took its business to the web .... The company maintains a database accessible from VideoPipeline.net, which contains movie trailers Video Pipeline has received throughout the years. Video Pipeline’s internet clients—retail web sites selling home videos—use VideoPipeline.net to display trailers to site visitors.... The operators of the web sites from which the trailers are accessed—Video Pipeline’s internet clients—pay a fee to have the trailers streamed [to site visitors] based on the number of megabytes shown to site visitors. Video Pipeline has agreements to stream trailers with approximately 25 online retailers, including Yahoo!, Amazon, and Best Buy....

[3] Video Pipeline included in its online database trailers it received under the License Agreement from Disney. Because the License Agreement did not permit this use, Disney requested that Video Pipeline remove the trailers from the database. It complied with that request.

[4] On October 24, 2000, however, Video Pipeline filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment that its online use of the trailers did not violate federal copyright law. Disney shortly thereafter terminated the License Agreement.

[5] Video Pipeline decided to replace some of the trailers it had removed at Disney’s request from its database. In order to do so, it copied approximately two minutes from each of at least 62 Disney movies to create its own clip previews of the movies. (Again, to distinguish between the previews created under the copyright holder’s authority and those created by Video Pipeline, we call the former “trailers” and the latter “clip previews” or “clips.” We use the term “previews” generically.) ...

[6] Disney also makes its trailers available online. It displays them on its own web sites in order to attract and to keep users there (a concept called “stickiness”) and then takes advantage of the users’ presence to advertise and sell other products. Disney has also entered into agreements to link its trailers with other businesses, and, for example, has such a link with the Apple Computer home page.

[7] Video Pipeline amended its complaint to seek a declaratory judgment allowing it to use the clip previews. Disney filed a counterclaim alleging copyright infringement. The District Court entered a preliminary
DISCUSSION ...

[8] Video Pipeline ... contends that Disney has misused its copyright and, as a result, should not receive the protection of copyright law. Video Pipeline points to certain licensing agreements that Disney has entered into with three companies and sought to enter into with a number of other companies operating web sites. Each of these licensing agreements provides that Disney, the licensor, will deliver trailers by way of hyperlinks for display on the licensee’s web site. The Agreements further state:

The Website in which the Trailers are used may not be derogatory to or critical of the
entertainment industry or of [Disney] (and its officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates,
divisions and subsidiaries) or of any motion picture produced or distributed by [Disney] ... [or] of
the materials from which the Trailers were taken or of any person involved with the production
of the Underlying Works. Any breach of this paragraph will render this license null and void and
Licensee will be liable to all parties concerned for defamation and copyright infringement, as
well as breach of contract....

[9] As Video Pipeline sees it, such licensing agreements seek to use copyright law to suppress criticism and, in so doing, misuse those laws, triggering the copyright misuse doctrine.

[10] Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has affirmatively recognized the copyright misuse doctrine. There is, however, a well-established patent misuse doctrine, and, as noted below, other courts of appeals have extended the doctrine to the copyright context.

[11] The misuse doctrine extends from the equitable principle that courts may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest. Misuse is not cause to invalidate the copyright or patent, but instead precludes its enforcement during the period of misuse. To defend on misuse grounds, the alleged infringer need not be subject to the purported misuse.

[12] Misuse often exists where the patent or copyright holder has engaged in some form of anti-competitive behavior. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (explaining that public policy “forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office”); Practice Management Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding copyright misuse where license to use copyrighted good prohibited licensee from using competing goods); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding the copyright holder misused its copyright by including in licensing agreements a provision that neither the licensee company nor its officers, employees, et al., could develop competing goods for the term of the agreement, ninety-nine years). More on point, however, is the underlying policy rationale for the misuse doctrine set out in the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent Clause: “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The ultimate aim of copyright law is to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. Put simply, our Constitution emphasizes the purpose and value of copyrights and patents. Harm caused by their misuse undermines their usefulness.

[13] Anti-competitive licensing agreements may conflict with the purpose behind a copyright’s protection by depriving the public of the would-be competitor’s creativity. The fair use doctrine and the refusal to copyright facts and ideas also address applications of copyright protection that would otherwise conflict with a copyright’s constitutional goal. But it is possible that a copyright holder could leverage its copyright to restrain the creative expression of another without engaging in anti-competitive behavior or implicating the fair use and idea/expression doctrines.
[14] For instance, the concurring opinion, written for a majority of the judges, in *Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc.*, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), concluded that pursuant to the unclean hands doctrine the District Court should not have entered a preliminary injunction against an alleged copyright infringer where the copyright holder sought to use his copyright “to restrict the dissemination of information.” In *Rosemont Enters.*, a corporation acting for the publicity-shy Howard Hughes purchased the copyright to an article about Hughes solely to bring an infringement suit to enjoin the publication of a forthcoming biography on Hughes. The concurring opinion reasoned:

> The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the copyright laws at least to the extent that the courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the public’s right to be informed regarding matters of general interest when anyone seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed to protect interests of quite a different nature.

[15] Although *Rosemont Enters.* did not concern an anti-competitive licensing agreement as in the typical misuse case, it focused—as do the misuse cases—on the copyright holder’s attempt to disrupt a copyright’s goal to increase the store of creative expression for the public good. A copyright holder’s attempt to restrict expression that is critical of it (or of its copyrighted good, or the industry in which it operates, etc.) may, in context, subvert—as do anti-competitive restrictions—a copyright’s policy goal to encourage the creation and dissemination to the public of creative activity.

[16] The licensing agreements in this case do seek to restrict expression by licensing the Disney trailers for use on the internet only so long as the web sites on which the trailers will appear do not derogate Disney, the entertainment industry, etc. But we nonetheless cannot conclude on this record that the agreements are likely to interfere with creative expression to such a degree that they affect in any significant way the policy interest in increasing the public store of creative activity. The licensing agreements do not, for instance, interfere with the licensee’s opportunity to express such criticism on other web sites or elsewhere. There is no evidence that the public will find it any more difficult to obtain criticism of Disney and its interests, or even that the public is considerably less likely to come across this criticism, if it is not displayed on the same site as the trailers.... Finally, copyright law, and the misuse doctrine in particular, should not be interpreted to require Disney, if it licenses its trailers for display on any web sites but its own, to do so willy-nilly regardless of the content displayed with its copyrighted works. Indeed such an application of the misuse doctrine would likely decrease the public’s access to Disney’s works because it might as a result refuse to license at all online display of its works.

[17] Thus, while we extend the patent misuse doctrine to copyright, and recognize that it might operate beyond its traditional anti-competition context, we hold it inapplicable here. On this record Disney’s licensing agreements do not interfere significantly with copyright policy (while holding to the contrary might, in fact, do so). The District Court therefore correctly held that Video Pipeline will not likely succeed on its copyright misuse defense....

**NOTES**

1. Kathryn Judge criticizes existing copyright misuse doctrine, and:

> calls for a clarification of the policy goals protected by misuse and for the adoption, where possible, of rules (or standards) to protect the identified policy goals. Copyright misuse already has been most accepted in an area where we have a clear policy goal and a defined line to protect it—competition and antitrust law. Yet many of the cases invoking copyright misuse, while rationalized as necessary to protect copyright policy, fail to specify the public policy at stake and how the copyright holder’s misuse undermines that policy. This clarification should
not only assist courts in adjudicating copyright misuse claims, but should also enhance the doctrine’s efficacy by putting copyright holders on notice of what constitutes misuse.

Examination of the cases applying and commentary discussing copyright misuse suggests that recognizing one additional policy aim and a couple of guidelines to protect it should be sufficient to encompass the great majority of violations the doctrine has thus far been asked to address. That policy is the protection of the values embodied in the First Amendment and the protective guidelines are the idea-expression distinction and fair use. Specifically, ... any attempt by a copyright holder to expand the scope of his copyright to gain control over an idea or to deter fair use should constitute misuse.

Note, Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 904-05 (2004). Do you agree with Judge’s assessment? How would applying her recommendations affect the outcome in Video Pipeline? For an argument that “copyright misuse should be decoupled from its basis in antitrust principles and instead should be based primarily in First Amendment speech principles,” see David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537 (2010).

2. Is the copyright misuse defense necessary if the copyright holder is acting anticompetitively in violation of the antitrust laws? When?

As you read the following case, consider a theory of how Omega might be misusing its copyright and how that theory relates to those considered in Video Pipeline.

Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
776 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2015)

[Before the Kirtsaeng case you studied in Chapter V on the importation right, the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in this case to address the same issue about the first-sale doctrine’s applicability with regard to the importation right. In this case, Costco had bought Omega watches abroad for less than their sale price in the United States, whereupon Costco sold them more cheaply in the United States than that sale price. The Supreme Court, sitting without Justice Kagan, deadlocked 4-4 on whether the first-sale doctrine applied to imports, which left the earlier Ninth Circuit decision in place that had held that it did not (which the Supreme Court later overturned in Kirtsaeng). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to Costco on the ground that Omega misused its copyright.]

NELSON, J.: ...


[2] Omega distributes its watches, including the Seamaster, through authorized distributors and dealers throughout the world, including the United States. In 2003, Costco and Omega discussed the possibility of Costco carrying Omega watches. The parties did not come to an agreement and Costco never became an authorized Omega retailer.
In 2004, Costco purchased 117 Seamaster watches bearing the Omega Globe on the so-called “gray market.” First, Omega sold the watches to authorized foreign distributors. Next, unidentified third parties purchased the watches and sold them to ENE Limited, a New York company. Costco purchased the watches from ENE Limited. Costco then sold 43 of those watches to its members in California. Omega undoubtedly authorized the initial sale of the watches but did not approve the importation of the watches into the United States or Costco’s later sale of the watches.

Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement, specifically the importation of copyrighted work without the copyright holder’s permission."

On remand [from the Supreme Court], the district court again granted summary judgment to Costco, finding that Omega misused its copyright of the Omega Globe to expand its limited monopoly impermissibly."

While briefing in this matter was pending, the Supreme Court revisited the first sale doctrine in Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355."

It is clear [from the Kirtsaeng ruling] that Omega has no infringement cause of action against Costco. Omega’s only allegation is that Costco violated Omega’s copyright-based importation and distribution rights by selling gray market watches without a prior authorized first sale in the United States. Omega concedes that it authorized a first sale of the watches in a foreign jurisdiction. Omega’s right to control importation and distribution of its copyrighted Omega Globe expired after that authorized first sale, and Costco’s subsequent sale of the watches did not constitute copyright infringement."

WARDLAW, J., concurring in the judgment:

The majority opinion fails to do justice to the facts presented by this unique lawsuit. Costco is one of America’s largest retailers. It is well known that Costco’s discount warehouses sell everything from pallets of toilet paper to slices of pizza. But only card-carrying members know that Costco also sells a wide range of luxury goods, including Dom Pérignon Champagne, Waterford crystal, Dolce & Gabbana handbags, and, until this lawsuit was filed, Omega watches.

Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement because Costco sold, without Omega’s permission, forty-three genuine Omega watches in the United States. Each watch Costco sold was engraved with a copyrighted Omega design, which Costco did not have permission to use. The district court concluded, however, that because Omega placed the Globe Design on its watches at least in part to control the importation and sale of Omega watches in the United States, Omega had misused its copyright. In District Court Judge Terry Hatter’s words, Omega impermissibly “used the defensive shield of copyright as an offensive sword.”

A.

Omega is a Swiss luxury watchmaker which distributes and sells its watches around the world through authorized distributors and retailers. It is also a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Swiss corporation the Swatch Group, Ltd. The Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc. is Omega’s authorized and exclusive distributor in the United States."

[3] In 2004, Costco purchased 117 Seamaster watches bearing the Omega Globe on the so-called “gray market.” First, Omega sold the watches to authorized foreign distributors. Next, unidentified third parties purchased the watches and sold them to ENE Limited, a New York company. Costco purchased the watches from ENE Limited. Costco then sold 43 of those watches to its members in California. Omega undoubtedly authorized the initial sale of the watches but did not approve the importation of the watches into the United States or Costco’s later sale of the watches.

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[5] On remand [from the Supreme Court], the district court again granted summary judgment to Costco, finding that Omega misused its copyright of the Omega Globe to expand its limited monopoly impermissibly."

[6] While briefing in this matter was pending, the Supreme Court revisited the first sale doctrine in Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355."

[7] It is clear [from the Kirtsaeng ruling] that Omega has no infringement cause of action against Costco. Omega’s only allegation is that Costco violated Omega’s copyright-based importation and distribution rights by selling gray market watches without a prior authorized first sale in the United States. Omega concedes that it authorized a first sale of the watches in a foreign jurisdiction. Omega’s right to control importation and distribution of its copyrighted Omega Globe expired after that authorized first sale, and Costco’s subsequent sale of the watches did not constitute copyright infringement."

WARDLAW, J., concurring in the judgment:

The district court granted summary judgment ... to Costco based on the defense of copyright misuse. The majority affirms the district court relying upon the Kirtsaeng-resurrected first sale doctrine .... I concur in the judgment affirming the district court, but do so based on the district court’s rationale for granting summary judgment—copyright misuse—and the arguments actually presented to us.

I."

The majority opinion fails to do justice to the facts presented by this unique lawsuit. Costco is one of America’s largest retailers. It is well known that Costco’s discount warehouses sell everything from pallets of toilet paper to slices of pizza. But only card-carrying members know that Costco also sells a wide range of luxury goods, including Dom Pérignon Champagne, Waterford crystal, Dolce & Gabbana handbags, and, until this lawsuit was filed, Omega watches.

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Omega is a Swiss luxury watchmaker which distributes and sells its watches around the world through authorized distributors and retailers. It is also a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Swiss corporation the Swatch Group, Ltd. The Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc. is Omega’s authorized and exclusive distributor in the United States.
States. Costco, a U.S. corporation, operates membership warehouse clubs which sell merchandise, including brand-name watches, to their members at lower prices than are available through many other retailers.

[11] Sometime before March 2003, Swatch U.S.A. learned that Costco was selling genuine Omega watches in the United States without Omega’s authorization. Costco had circumvented Omega’s distribution model and procured the Omega watches through the “gray market.” Gray market goods, or parallel imports, are genuine brand-name products typically manufactured abroad, purchased, and imported into the United States by third parties. Retailers are able to sell these products at a discount through arbitrage, e.g., if Omega’s watches retail for less in Morocco than in the United States, and Costco procures the watches at the Moroccan price and then imports them into the United States, Costco can undercut the authorized U.S. retailers. Costco was only the latest in a series of unauthorized retailers selling Omega watches in the United States. Because Costco and the other “unauthorized” retailers were selling Omega watches at far lower prices than Omega’s suggested retail price, Swatch U.S.A. began to receive complaints from authorized Omega retailers.3 Swatch U.S.A.’s then-president was faced with a mounting distribution problem. To increase Swatch U.S.A.’s control over Omega watches in the United States, Swatch U.S.A.’s president took action “to stem the tide of the gray market.”

[12] Swatch U.S.A.’s legal department devised a strategy to use copyright protection to strengthen Omega’s control over the importation of Omega watches into the United States. On March 12, 2003, Omega registered its “Globe Design” for U.S. copyright protection, and then began engraving a miniscule Globe Design on the underside of the best-selling Seamaster watch. Although the Omega Seamaster was the first product line engraved with the Globe Design, Omega’s plan was to eventually place copyrighted engravings on many of Swatch U.S.A.’s product lines and use the design’s copyright protection to prevent unauthorized retailers from selling Omega’s watches.4

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3 When this lawsuit was filed in 2004, Omega’s suggested retail price for the Omega “Seamaster,” one of the brand’s best-selling watches and the watch that is at the center of this copyright dispute, was $1,995. Costco sold the watch for the price of $1,299.

4 Although Omega had been engraving artistic designs, such as its “Seahorse,” on the underside of its watches for decades as “a mark of prestige and luxury and identification,” the Globe Design was markedly different. By contrast to the “Seahorse,” which was prominently displayed on the watch’s underside, the Globe Design measured only one-eighth of an inch in diameter—roughly the size of the hole in a Cheerio. Also, unlike it had with the “Seahorse,” Omega neither advertised nor promoted the Globe Design.

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Figure 118: Omega watch globe, as compared with U.S. Quarter
[13] On remand [from the U.S. Supreme Court in the ensuing lawsuit], the parties … cross-moved for summary judgment…. [T]he district court granted Costco’s motion for summary judgment, based on the equitable defense of copyright misuse. The district court found that the purpose of Omega’s lawsuit was to “stem the tide of the grey market” and the “unauthorized importation of Omega watches into the U.S.” Omega had conceded that it had affixed the copyrighted Globe Design to the underside of its watches to take advantage of section 602 of the Copyright Act, which makes the importation of copyrighted goods into the United States without the copyright owner’s authorization a violation of the owner’s exclusive right to distribute. The district court concluded that Omega misused its copyright in the Globe Design by leveraging its limited monopoly over the design to control the importation and sale of Seamaster watches.

II.

A. …

[14] Because Omega’s watches are useful articles, they are not copyrightable, with some possible exceptions not before us. Because the watches are not the proper subject of copyright protection, Omega does not argue that Costco infringed copyrights protecting its watches, the argument upon which the majority rests its opinion. Instead, it argues that Costco infringed its limited monopoly over the copyrighted Globe Design, which was engraved on the watches that Costco sold.

[15] Inherent in granting a copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce his works is the risk that he will abuse the limited monopoly his copyright provides by restricting competition in a market that is beyond the scope of his copyright. An owner’s attempt to impermissibly expand his lawful protection from competition contravenes not only the policy of the copyright laws, but also the central purpose of the antitrust laws. Copyright misuse is a judicially crafted affirmative defense to copyright infringement designed to combat the impermissible extension of a copyright’s limited monopoly. Its purpose is to prevent holders of copyrights from leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside the monopoly.

[16] The defense of copyright misuse, however, is not limited to discouraging anti-competitive behavior. Indeed, the question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law, but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright…. Copyright misuse does not invalidate a copyright, but precludes its enforcement during the period of misuse.

[17] The copyright misuse doctrine forbids the use of the copyright to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office. The defense is often applied when a defendant can prove either: (1) a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) that the copyright owner otherwise illegally extended its monopoly; or (3) that the copyright owner violated the public policies underlying the copyright laws. We have discussed copyright misuse in only a handful of published opinions. But while we have applied the doctrine sparingly, copyright misuse is a valid defense, the contours of which are still being defined.…

[18] …. This appeal presents the novel issue whether Omega’s attempted use of its Globe Design copyright to control imports and restrict competition from unauthorized retailers of its watches, which are neither copyrightable nor copyrighted, constitutes copyright misuse.

B. …

[19] The district court correctly held that Omega misused its copyright “by leveraging its limited monopoly in being able to control the importation of [the Globe Design] to control the importation of its Seamaster watches.” The district court did not clearly err in finding that: (1) Omega copyrighted the Globe Design, at the advice of its legal department, to control the importation and distribution of Omega watches into the United
States; and (2) Omega told its authorized distributors that the purpose of suing Costco was to “stem the tide of the grey market” and the “unauthorized importation of Omega watches into the U.S.” In other words, Omega attempted to use the copyrighted Globe Design to decrease competition in the U.S. importation and distribution of its watches by it and its authorized dealers—an obvious leveraging of a copyright to control an area outside its limited monopoly on the design.

[20] Omega argues that its anti-competitive motives are irrelevant to the issue of copyright misuse. According to Omega, our inquiry should instead focus on the copyright holder’s objective conduct or use. But Omega’s semantic hairsplitting is unpersuasive. By definition, “use” includes an inquiry into purpose. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1681 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “use” as “The application or employment of something; esp., a long-continued possession and employment of a thing for a purpose for which it is adapted”) (emphasis added). However, we need not decide whether Omega’s motives are sufficient to establish copyright misuse. The undisputed record shows that before this lawsuit consumers were able to buy a genuine Omega Seamaster watch from Costco for 35% less than Omega’s suggested retail price. This is no longer the case. Thus, at least one consequence of Omega’s lawsuit has been a reduction of intrabrand price competition for uncopyrightable Omega watches in the United States.

[21] Lastly, because copyright misuse is an equitable defense to an infringement action, the core of our inquiry is whether equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the copyright by declining to entertain a suit for infringement until the improper practice has been abandoned and the consequences of the misuse of the copyright have been dissipated. If Omega was using its copyright in a manner contrary to public policy, we, as a court of equity, may refuse to aid such misuse.

[22] Equity supports the district court’s refusal to enforce Omega’s copyright in its Globe Design against Costco during the period of Omega’s misuse. Omega wielded its copyrighted Globe Design to restrict unauthorized retailers from selling genuine Omega watches procured from the gray market. Indeed, in his deposition, Swatch U.S.A.’s president agreed that the “whole purpose” of creating the Globe Design in the first place was to prevent unauthorized retailers from selling Omega watches. Because unauthorized retailers, such as Costco, were selling gray market Omega watches in the United States below Omega’s suggested retail price, Omega attempted to maintain the price of its watches sold in the United States by inconspicuously engraving the copyrighted Globe Design on the underside of its Seamaster watches. Even drawing all reasonable inferences in Omega’s favor, there is no genuine dispute as to whether Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement at least in part to control the unauthorized importation and sale of Omega watches. Thus, the district court did not err in granting Costco’s motion for summary judgment on the copyright misuse defense.

[23] Omega’s right to control distribution of its copyrighted work is not limitless. The Supreme Court has made clear that the property right granted by copyright law cannot be used with impunity to extend power in the marketplace beyond what Congress intended. Copyright misuse bars a culpable plaintiff from prevailing on an action for the infringement of the misused copyright. The Copyright Office granted Omega the exclusive right to control the importation and distribution of the Globe Design into the United States. It did not empower Omega to restrict competition from unauthorized retailers selling genuine, gray market Seamaster watches in the United States. Although the Globe Design engraved on the underside of the Seamaster watches was copyrighted, Omega misused its copyright when it used its intellectual property protection to obtain a copyright-like monopoly over uncopyrightable Seamaster watches. Omega’s expansion of its copyright-like monopoly eliminated competition from unauthorized watch retailers like Costco, thereby allowing Omega to control—through its exclusive distributor, Swatch U.S.A.—the retail pricing of Seamaster watches sold in the United States. If the copyright law allowed Omega to use its copyright to combat the importation and sale of all gray market watches that are stamped with the Globe Design, it would effectively
grant Omega a copyright-like monopoly over the distribution and sale of Omega watches in the United States. Because such an outcome directly controverts the aims of copyright law, it is impermissible....

[24] .... Even when drawing all reasonable inferences in Omega’s favor, there is no genuine dispute concerning whether restricting retail competition was one of the reasons Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement.

[25] Omega had other available remedies. It could have terminated its distribution agreements with the distributors that sold Omega watches outside of their designated territories. Or, if Omega believed that Costco, or intermediaries like ENE Limited, were inducing distributors to breach their contracts, Omega may have been able to sue them for tortious interference. Instead, Omega improvidently decided to sue Costco for copyright infringement. By doing so, Omega misused the Congressionally limited power of copyright protection to address a problem better left for other avenues of relief.

[26] .... Because the district court correctly held that Omega misused its copyright in the Globe Design by attempting to leverage its limited monopoly over the design to control the importation and sale of Seamaster watches, I would affirm the district court on the issue of copyright misuse.

NOTES

1. For purposes of assessing copyright misuse (or any other copyright doctrine, for that matter), does it and should it matter why a copyright holder is asserting its rights? Jeanne Fromer observes that not all those who assert infringement of their copyright are doing so because they think they’ve experienced copyright harm: “a not insignificant number of assertions of copyright rights against third parties seek not to protect these interests, but others, such as privacy, protection of ancillary markets, or mere extraction of rents without making a sufficient contribution to society.” Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 549, 551 (2015). Fromer reasons that “assertions of rights with ill-fitting motivations are sufficiently worrisome that courts ought to strongly consider weighing these motivations before granting relief.” Why? She elaborates:

The biggest worry is that these assertions will distort the intellectual property system, causing harm to society. There are two related worries of distortion and harm. First, ... copyright ... law[ is] calibrated to offer up incentive to create and disseminate valuable works to benefit society, but limited in time and scope to ameliorate the costs that the incentive of exclusive rights imposes on society. On this view, copyright ... law[ was] designed with particular scenarios in mind, and [its] costs and benefits are attuned to those scenarios. Assertions of intellectual property outside of these scenarios can impose greater cost on society than the intellectual property laws had anticipated without concomitant benefit.... Allowing copyright ... claims to succeed[,] for example[,] when the rightsholder has not contributed much to societal progress in ways that matter to the law’s foundations are troubling, because they impose the cost of protection on society without a corresponding gain. Similarly, assertions of protection for markets beyond the protected market—be they in relation to privacy and reputational interests or more generally—raise the specter of great cost to society. If rights are protected in those cases, they are likely to impose an additional cost on society because they will be imposing restrictions on market interests outside of the copyright ... system in addition to those within. On this reasoning, it makes sense for courts to screen out assertions of copyright ... rights by plaintiffs with motivations unrelated to the intellectual property system.

More subtly, there is another distortion and harm that can be imposed by assertions of intellectual property with motives mismatched to copyright ... laws.... [C]ourts’ interpretations of ... copyright laws can be influenced by the plaintiff’s mismatched motivation. These
interpretations, if not carefully and explicitly tailored to the particular circumstances of the plaintiff’s motivation for asserting rights, can affect others with more typical motivations for asserting their rights.

Do you agree that a plaintiff’s motivations for asserting copyright sometimes ought to affect a court’s decision? If so, how should courts respond to assertions of copyright infringement with ill-fitting motivations?

2. A party who has engaged in copyright misuse is restrained from enforcing the copyright or copyrights that have been misused, and such restraint is imposed until the misuse has been “cured.” A recent case is instructive on how a plaintiff can cure copyright misuse. In this case, Disney had been distributing some of its movies in Combo Packs, which included a Blu-Ray disc, a DVD, and an alphanumeric code that could be redeemed online to stream or download a digital copy. Small print on the outside of the Combo Pack boxes stated that “Codes are not for sale or transfer.” Even finer print on the boxes’ bottom stated that “Terms and Conditions apply” with regard to the digital codes. The download code includes instructions for download and also states that “Codes are not for sale or transfer.” The download website states—along with other terms—that by redeeming a code, the user “represents that [he] is the owner of the physical product that accompanied the digital code at the time of purchase. The redemption of a digital code sold or transferred separate from the original physical product is prohibited.”

Disney sued Redbox for contributory copyright infringement for purchasing Disney’s Combo Packs, disaggregating the three items in the packs, and then offering each for separate distribution (including the download codes for sale). Disney maintained that Redbox’s resale of Combo Pack digital download codes encouraged end users to make unauthorized reproductions of Disney’s copyrighted works.

The district court denied Disney a preliminary injunction on the ground that it was unlikely to succeed on the merits due to its commission of copyright misuse. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. CV 17–08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 WL 1942139 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018). The court elaborated:

Disney’s copyrights do not give it the power to prevent consumers from selling or otherwise transferring the Blu-ray discs and DVDs contained within Combo Packs…. Nevertheless, the terms of [the] digital download services’ license agreements purport to give Disney a power specifically denied to copyright holders by § 109(a). [They] require[] redeemers to represent that they are currently the owner of the physical product that accompanied the digital code at the time of purchase…. Thus, Combo Pack purchasers cannot access digital movie content, for which they have already paid, without exceeding the scope of the license agreement unless they forego their statutorily-guaranteed right to distribute their physical copies of that same movie as they see fit. This improper leveraging of Disney’s copyright in the digital content to restrict secondary transfers of physical copies directly implicates and conflicts with public policy enshrined in the Copyright Act, and constitutes copyright misuse.

(Note that the court finds copyright misuse even though all of the content that Disney seeks to control is copyrighted, by contrast with Omega.) Disney responded by expeditiously revising its terms in an attempt to cure the misuse (and bolster its copyright infringement claim). Among other things, the new terms no longer required physical possession of the physical products contained in the Combo Packs to download but instead required that the digital code “may be redeemed only by an individual who obtains the code in the original combination disc + code package” and that “[d]igital codes are not authorized for redemption if sold separately.” The district court thought that, in light of this and other changed language, Disney had now shown a likelihood of success on its claim for copyright infringement and granted a preliminary injunction against Redbox. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2018). In so doing, the court ruled that Disney could move forward to enforce its copyrights because it was no longer
misusing its copyrights. The court explained that Disney’s “revised terms do not encroach upon disc owners’ alienation rights or improperly expand Disney’s power beyond the sphere of copyright. Under the revised terms, Combo Pack purchasers and recipients continue to enjoy digital access regardless whether they keep or dispose of the physical discs.”

3. Do you think copyright misuse is better left as an affirmative defense to copyright infringement? Or would it be preferable to create an affirmative cause of action that can be brought for copyright misuse?

4. Can copyright non-use ever constitute copyright misuse? If not, should the defense be expanded to include it under appropriate circumstances?

D. Preemption

In addition to copyright misuse, courts might also restrict the operation of contract law by invoking preemption when the state law of contracts conflicts in certain ways with the operation of the federal copyright law. Contract law is not the only state law that can conflict with copyright law, and we will also touch on the ways that copyright law can preempt the operation of other state laws. Usually, these state laws expand copyright protection, but the relevant state laws might theoretically also contract copyright protection. Both categories of state law raise preemption issues.

Think for a moment about many of the categories of material you’ve already learned about that copyright law has been held not to protect: these include (just to name a few) databases lacking originality, soundalike sound recordings, ideas, historical facts, and many useful articles. Can state law protect these categories in spite of their lack of protection under federal copyright law, either by providing outright protection to these categories or by enforcing contracts between private parties that provide a form of this protection between the contracting parties?

Recall that the Constitution grants Congress authority “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Pursuant to this grant of power, Congress has enacted copyright law. Take a step back for a moment to consider why the Framers might have been motivated to federalize copyright law in the first instance. The primary rationale was to provide a uniform national copyright law. Previously, a number of states had had copyright laws, but the differences inhibited the development of national markets: The substantive rules could vary from state to state—meaning, for example, that the authors of a work might be different depending on the state—and the administrative burdens were greater, with a need to register copyright in each state or bring suit in each state. The 1790 Act aimed to displace state copyright laws and bring published authors into the federal copyright protection scheme. Uniformity was also a strong motivator for bringing unpublished works into federal copyright law in the 1976 Act.

Does this desire for uniformity in copyright law indicate that states can play no role in supplementing or changing it at all? This question is analyzed under the rubric of preemption. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides a basis for preemption of state law by federal law. The Clause provides that “[t]he Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.

lawful exercise of authority, to state explicitly how its laws preempt state laws. The other two forms of preemption are implicit. Field preemption dictates that federal law supersedes state law when there is a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it," either "because the federal interest [in the field] is so dominant or because the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Id. at 204. Conflict preemption "arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. A state law is preempted by federal law if any one or more of these three categories of preemption is found.

Consider first field preemption in the context of copyright law. The Supreme Court's rulings seem to reject the possibility of field preemption for copyright law. In particular, in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), the Court rejected a preemption challenge to a California law criminalizing unauthorized copying of sound recordings with intent to sell them, at a time when the federal copyright law did not yet confer protection on sound recordings. The Court reasoned that "[a]lthough the Copyright Clause .. recognizes the potential benefits of a national system, it does not indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded." This statement seems to reject field preemption for copyright law.

Now consider conflict preemption in the context of federal intellectual property laws. Conflict preemption can be complex and hard to model, but to give you a feel for it, let's look at two Supreme Court decisions on conflict preemption, one that concludes that there isn't conflict preemption and one that concludes that there is.

In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the federal patent laws did not preempt state contract law "to preclude enforcement of a contract to pay royalties to a patent applicant, on sales of articles embodying the putative invention, for so long as the contracting party sells them, if a patent is not granted." In that case, the parties had contracted for a specific royalty rate, which would be de-escalated by half were no patent to issue within five years. The Court thought that the contract at issue complemented, rather than interfered with, the balance effectuated by the federal patent scheme. It thought that the royalty contract provided an extra incentive to innovate, did not discourage patenting, promoted disclosure by encouraging the invention's commercialization, and did not remove any unpatented invention from the public domain (as the invention had not truly been in the public domain at the time of contracting and remained available to anyone else to use freely once the patent was not granted).

The Supreme Court considered patent law's preemptive effect again in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), in ruling on the constitutionality of a Florida law prohibiting the use of direct molding to duplicate for sale any manufactured vessel hull or component thereof without permission. The Court held that federal patent law preempted the state law. It reasoned that the U.S. Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause "reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" As such, the Court continued, progress of science and useful arts is promoted—and authorized—only when rights of limited duration are granted and when the public domain is guarded against removals of material therein. To the Court, the patent laws effectuate this balance with its requirements of novelty and nonobviousness, which ensure that the public domain is the norm rather than the exception, and patent law's disclosure rules, which induce a public sharing of information for the benefit of the public domain. Through this analytical lens, the Court reasoned that the Florida law was preempted, as it upset this balance. For one thing, the state law's purpose was the same as that set out in the Intellectual Property Clause: to promote technological progress. Additionally, it sought to do that by upsetting patent law's balance between
promoting innovation through rights and competition, by providing producers with protection over unpatentable designs, which by the federal scheme, ought to be in the public domain.

In explaining the different result in Aronson, the Bonito Boats Court observed:

We have ... reaffirmed the pragmatic approach which [we] take[] to the pre-emption of state laws dealing with the protection of intellectual property. See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (“State law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.”). At the same time, we have consistently reiterated the teaching of [other cases] that ideas once placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without significant restraint.

Id. at 156. Do you think that Aronson and Bonito Boats are reconcilable in their approaches? For an argument that they are, see Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991).

If nothing else, the different results in Aronson and Bonito Boats—not to mention many other decisions on conflict preemption by federal intellectual property laws—might underscore that even if the general framework for evaluating conflict preemption is clear, its application is not always clear. For an argument that courts’ analyses of conflict preemption would be clarified and sharpened were courts to take account of the Intellectual Property Clause in their analyses, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). In particular, Fromer argues that “state laws are preempted when they both fall within the IP Clause’s preemptive scope and upset the IP Clause’s balance, as instantiated by federal law.”

Express preemption is also relevant to copyright law. In its 1976 revision of copyright law, Congress included a preemption provision in § 301. Section 301 provides that state laws are preempted when two conditions are met: (1) they confer “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights” provided by federal copyright law; and (2) they protect “works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103” of the copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Section 301 was intended to clarify copyright’s preemptive reach. (For a thorough history of this provision, see Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509.)

Despite the seeming determinacy of the Copyright Act’s express preemption provision, the often-conflicting judicial decisions construing and applying § 301 underscore that, however express the preemption, analysis of the preemption provision’s scope is far from crystal-clear. In particular, when is a state right equivalent to copyright’s exclusive rights, as the first factor requires? Most courts find that a state right is not preempted under § 301 when it contains an “extra element” not found under federal copyright protection. For example, the Sixth Circuit holds:

Equivalency exists if the right defined by state law may be abridged by an act which in and of itself would infringe one of the exclusive rights. Conversely, if an extra element is required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, there is no preemption, provided that the extra element changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim.

Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001). Under this framework, most state rights, including laws of contract, trade secrecy, and rights of publicity, are not likely to be preempted by § 301, as
they have additional elements that copyright law does not. By contrast, a minority of courts hold that a state law is “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights” in § 106 if a copyright holder violates the state law merely by exercising any of his or her exclusive rights. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). From this second framework, state laws can more easily be preempted under § 301.

In light of copyright law’s express-preemption provision in § 301, many courts begin and end their analysis of copyright preemption with that section. However, to the extent that a state law causes an actual conflict or creates a sufficient obstacle to the goals of federal law, the Supremacy Clause, as understood by the Supreme Court, should nullify that state law pursuant to principles of conflict preemption. This is true even if the express preemption provision in § 301 does not nullify that state law: The Supreme Court has rejected the “argument that the presence of [an] express pre-emption provision entirely foreclose[s] the possibility of conflict pre-emption,” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872 (2000), thereby suggesting that courts should always proceed with an analysis of conflict preemption by federal copyright law even if § 301 does not preempt the state law at hand.

With this background on preemption doctrine, let’s consider whether contracts modifying copyright law’s rules are ever preempted by copyright law. You may already be familiar with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). In that case, ProCD had created a searchable database from 3,000 telephone directories. Probably fearing that the database would not be original (and therefore not copyrightable) post-Feist, it included a mass-market shrinkwrap license with the CD-ROM discs it sold to consumers. Although the license for consumers forbade it, purchaser Matthew Zeidenberg resold the data contained in the database for a profit. (A higher-priced version of the electronic database—intended for businesses—contained no such contractual restrictions.) ProCD sued Zeidenberg for breach of contract, and the Seventh Circuit held that the contract was enforceable and not preempted by copyright law. ProCD became an influential case, and indeed, you’ll see that the next case discusses it.

As you read the following case, think about the best case you can make under express- and conflict-preemption principles for preemption of the contract at issue here, and against preemption of it. How does your framing of the case differ depending on your stance? Also, is there a material difference for preemption between a state law modifying copyright law and a contractual agreement doing the same?

**Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.**

320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)

RADER, J.:

I.

[1] Harold L. Bowers created a template to improve computer aided design (CAD) software....

[2] .... Mr. Bowers bundled [software] together as the Designer’s Toolkit. Mr. Bowers sold the Designer’s Toolkit with a shrink-wrap license that, inter alia, prohibited any reverse engineering.
In 1989, Baystate also developed and marketed other [CAD] tools .... In 1988 and 1989, Mr. Bowers offered to establish a formal relationship with Baystate .... Baystate rejected that offer, however, telling Mr. Bowers that it believed it had “the in-house capability to develop the type of products you have proposed.”

In 1990, Mr. Bowers released Designer’s Toolkit. By January 1991, Baystate had obtained copies of that product. Three months later, Baystate introduced the substantially revised Draft–Pak version 3, incorporating many of the features of Designer’s Toolkit....

Baystate sued Mr. Bowers for declaratory judgment that 1) Baystate’s products do not infringe [Bowers’ patent], 2) the patent is invalid, and 3) the patent is unenforceable. Mr. Bowers filed counterclaims for copyright infringement, patent infringement, and breach of contract.

Following trial, the jury found for Mr. Bowers and awarded $1,948,869 for copyright infringement, $3,831,025 for breach of contract, and $232,977 for patent infringement. The district court, however, set aside the copyright damages as duplicative of the contract damages and entered judgment for $5,270,142 ....

II. ...

Baystate contends that the Copyright Act preempts the prohibition of reverse engineering embodied in Mr. Bowers’ shrink-wrap license agreements. Swayed by this argument, the district court considered Mr. Bowers’ contract and copyright claims coextensive. The district court instructed the jury that “reverse engineering violates the license agreement only if Baystate’s product that resulted from reverse engineering infringes Bowers’ copyright because it copies protectable expression.” Mr. Bowers lodged a timely objection to this instruction. This court holds that the Copyright Act does not preempt or narrow the scope of Mr. Bowers’ contract claim.

The Copyright Act provides that “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). [We] do[] not interpret this language to require preemption as long as a state cause of action requires an extra element, beyond mere copying, preparation of derivative works, performance, distribution or display. Nevertheless, not every extra element of a state law claim will establish a qualitative variance between the rights protected by federal copyright law and those protected by state law....

The Copyright Act does not preempt the state contract action in this case. Indeed, most courts to examine this issue have found that the Copyright Act does not preempt contractual constraints on copyrighted articles. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a shrink-wrap license was not preempted by federal copyright law).

In ProCD, for example, the court found that the mutual assent and consideration required by a contract claim render that claim qualitatively different from copyright infringement.... [T]he court in ProCD reasoned: “A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’” .... [W]e follow the reasoning of ProCD and the majority of other courts to consider this issue. This court, therefore, holds that the Copyright Act does not preempt Mr. Bowers’ contract claims.

In making this determination, this court has left untouched the conclusions reached in [other cases] regarding reverse engineering as a statutory fair use exception to copyright infringement.... Likewise, this claim distinction does not conflict with the expressly defined circumstances in which reverse engineering is not copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (section of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act) ....
Moreover, while the Fifth Circuit has held a state law prohibiting all copying of a computer program is preempted by the federal Copyright Act, Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), no evidence suggests the First Circuit (whose case law governs on this issue) would extend this concept to include private contractual agreements supported by mutual assent and consideration. The First Circuit recognizes contractual waiver of affirmative defenses and statutory rights. [P]rivate parties are free to contractually forego the limited ability to reverse engineer a software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act. Of course, a party bound by such a contract may elect to efficiently breach the agreement in order to ascertain ideas in a computer program unprotected by copyright law. Under such circumstances, the breaching party must weigh the benefits of breach against the arguably de minimus damages arising from merely discerning non-protected code.

DYK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I join the majority opinion except insofar as it holds that the contract claim is not preempted by federal law.... By holding that shrinkwrap licenses that override the fair use defense are not preempted by the Copyright Act, the majority has rendered a decision in conflict with the only other federal court of appeals decision that has addressed the issue—the Fifth Circuit decision in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). The majority’s approach permits state law to eviscerate an important federal copyright policy reflected in the fair use defense, and the majority’s logic threatens other federal copyright policies as well. I respectfully dissent.

I

Congress has made the Copyright Act the exclusive means for protecting copyright. The Act provides that “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). All other laws, including the common law, are preempted....

The test for preemption by copyright law ... should be whether the state law “substantially impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected” material. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 144, 157, 167 (1989). That test seeks to determine whether the state cause of action contains an additional element not present in the copyright right, such as scienter. If the state cause of action contains such an extra element, it is not preempted by the Copyright Act. However, such an action is equivalent in substance to a copyright infringement claim and thus preempted by the Copyright Act where the additional element merely concerns the extent to which authors and their licensees can prohibit unauthorized copying by third parties.

II

The fair use defense is an important limitation on copyright....

.... [T]he fair use defense for reverse engineering is necessary so that copyright protection does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work,” as proscribed by the Copyright Act.

III

A state is not free to eliminate the fair use defense. Enforcement of a total ban on reverse engineering would conflict with the Copyright Act itself by protecting otherwise unprotectable material. If state law provided that a copyright holder could bar fair use of the copyrighted material by placing a black dot on each copy of the work offered for sale, there would be no question but that the state law would be preempted. A
state law that allowed a copyright holder to simply label its products so as to eliminate a fair use defense would “substantially impede” the public’s right to fair use and allow the copyright holder, through state law, to protect material that the Congress has determined must be free to all under the Copyright Act. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157.

[19] I nonetheless agree with the majority opinion that a state can permit parties to contract away a fair use defense or to agree not to engage in uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by the copyright law, if the contract is freely negotiated. A freely negotiated agreement represents the “extra element” that prevents preemption of a state law claim that would otherwise be identical to the infringement claim barred by the fair use defense of reverse engineering.

[20] However, state law giving effect to shrinkwrap licenses is no different in substance from a hypothetical black dot law. Like any other contract of adhesion, the only choice offered to the purchaser is to avoid making the purchase in the first place. State law thus gives the copyright holder the ability to eliminate the fair use defense in each and every instance at its option. In doing so, as the majority concedes, it authorizes “shrinkwrap agreements ... [that] are far broader than the protection afforded by copyright law.”

IV

[21] There is, moreover, no logical stopping point to the majority’s reasoning. The amici rightly question whether under our original opinion the first sale doctrine and a host of other limitations on copyright protection might be eliminated by shrinkwrap licenses in just this fashion. If by printing a few words on the outside of its product a party can eliminate the fair use defense, then it can also, by the same means, restrict a purchaser from asserting the “first sale” defense, embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), or any other of the protections Congress has afforded the public in the Copyright Act. That means that, under the majority’s reasoning, state law could extensively undermine the protections of the Copyright Act.

V

[22] The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Vault directly supports preemption of the shrinkwrap limitation. The majority states that Vault held that “a state law prohibiting all copying of a computer program is preempted by the federal Copyright Act” and then states that “no evidence suggests the First Circuit would extend this concept to include private contractual agreements supported by mutual assent and consideration.” But, in fact, the Fifth Circuit held that the specific provision of state law that authorized contracts prohibiting reverse engineering, decompilation, or disassembly of computer programs was preempted by federal law because it conflicted with a portion of the Copyright Act and because it “touched upon an area of federal copyright law.” From a preemption standpoint, there is no distinction between a state law that explicitly validates a contract that restricts reverse engineering (Vault) and general common law that permits such a restriction (as here). On the contrary, the preemption clause of the Copyright Act makes clear that it covers “any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (emphasis added).

[23] I do not read ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), the only other court of appeals shrinkwrap case, as being to the contrary, even though it contains broad language stating that “a simple two-party contract is not ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.” In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit validated a shrinkwrap license that restricted the use of a CD-ROM to non-commercial purposes, which the defendant had violated by charging users a fee to access the CD-ROM over the Internet. The court held that the restriction to non-commercial use of the program was not equivalent to any rights protected by the Copyright Act. Rather, the “contract reflect[ed] private ordering, essential to efficient functioning of markets.” The court saw the licensor as legitimately seeking to distinguish between
personal and commercial use. “ProCD offers software and data for two prices: one for personal use, a higher prices for commercial use,” the court said. The defendant “wants to use the data without paying the seller’s price.” The court also emphasized that the license “would not withdraw any information from the public domain” because all of the information on the CD-ROM was publicly available.

[24] The case before us is different from ProCD. The Copyright Act does not confer a right to pay the same amount for commercial and personal use. It does, however, confer a right to fair use, 17 U.S.C. § 107, which we have held encompasses reverse engineering....

[25] I conclude that Vault states the correct rule; that state law authorizing shrinkwrap licenses that prohibit reverse engineering is preempted; and that the First Circuit would so hold because the extra element here merely concerns the extent to which authors and their licensees can prohibit unauthorized copying by third parties. I respectfully dissent.

NOTES

1. Whether one thinks principles of conflict preemption have a hefty role to play in invalidating state contract laws in favor of federal copyright law is influenced heavily by one’s view on whether copyright law provides default rules that parties are free to contract around, or instead whether copyright law crafts an intricate balance between providing and restricting rights to promote the progress of arts and culture, a balance which would be upset by parties varying copyright’s rules in contracts. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265 (Shyamkrishna Balganesha ed., 2013); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Maureen O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995).

2. Should the fact that the copyright restrictions in the contract in Bowers were not negotiated matter to the analysis? For an argument that it should, see Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45 (2007).


preemption cases are concerned with whether a state regulatory scheme is likely to supplant a federal scheme. In cases dealing with preemption of contracts, however, that is not ordinarily the issue. State law is necessary to enforce contracts, but the obligations are voluntarily assumed. Thus, the issue is really whether individuals should be able to contract away rights granted by the federal Copyright Act.

As a consequence, she maintains that “in analyzing the Copyright Act’s preemption of contracts, courts should draw more from the law related to contractual waiver of statutory rights.” Id. Does this analysis help you make better sense of Bowers?


Either way, Guy Rub argues that any such contracting changes following decisions like Bowers are irrelevant in practice: He maintains that litigation following ProCD has principally involved not non-negotiated mass consumer contracts modifying contract terms, but sophisticated parties and their individually negotiated
contracts. For that reason, he concludes that “[c]ontracts do not seem to pose a significant risk to copyright policy.” Guy A. Rub, *Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict*, 103 VA. L. REV. 1141 (2017). Are you convinced by this argument?

5. Could you resolve the preemption claim in *Bowers* instead using principles of copyright misuse?

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The following decision was rendered before the Supreme Court decided in *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that federal courts considering state law claims under diversity jurisdiction cannot engage in federal common lawmaking. As you read this decision, consider how this decision would come out were it instead evaluated by applying preemption doctrines to a state law cause of action for misappropriation. Relatedly, would it have been possible for the plaintiff to have brought this case instead with a federal copyright infringement claim?

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**International News Service v. Associated Press**

248 U.S. 215 (1918)

PITNEY, J.:

[1] The parties are competitors in the gathering and distribution of news and its publication for profit in newspapers throughout the United States. The Associated Press, which was complainant in the District Court, is a co-operative organization, ... its members being individuals who are either proprietors or representatives of about 950 daily newspapers published in all parts of the United States.... Complainant gathers in all parts of the world, by means of various instrumentalities of its own, by exchange with its members, and by other appropriate means, news and intelligence of current and recent events of interest to newspaper readers and distributes it daily to its members for publication in their newspapers. The cost of the service, amounting approximately to $3,500,000 per annum, is assessed upon the members and becomes a part of their costs of operation, to be recouped, presumably with profit, through the publication of their several newspapers. Under complainant’s by-laws each member agrees upon assuming membership that news received through complainant’s service is received exclusively for publication in a particular newspaper, language, and place specified in the certificate of membership, that no other use of it shall be permitted, and that no member shall furnish or permit any one in his employ or connected with his newspaper to furnish any of complainant’s news in advance of publication to any person not a member. And each member is required to gather the local news of his district and supply it to the Associated Press and to no one else.

[2] Defendant is a corporation ... whose business is the gathering and selling of news to its customers and clients, consisting of newspapers published throughout the United States, under contracts by which they pay certain amounts at stated times for defendant’s service. It has widespread news-gathering agencies; the cost of its operations amounts, it is said, to more than $2,000,000 per annum; and it serves about 400 newspapers located in the various cities of the United States and abroad, a few of which are represented, also, in the membership of the Associated Press.

[3] The parties are in the keenest competition between themselves in the distribution of news throughout the United States; and so, as a rule, are the newspapers that they serve, in their several districts.

[4] Complainant in its bill, defendant in its answer, have set forth in almost identical terms the rather obvious circumstances and conditions under which their business is conducted. The value of the service, and of the
news furnished, depends upon the promptness of transmission, as well as upon the accuracy and impartiality of the news; it being essential that the news be transmitted to members or subscribers as early or earlier than similar information can be furnished to competing newspapers by other news services, and that the news furnished by each agency shall not be furnished to newspapers which do not contribute to the expense of gathering it....

[5] The bill was filed to restrain the pirating of complainant's news by defendant .... by copying news from bulletin boards and from early editions of complainant's newspapers and selling this, either bodily or after rewriting it, to defendant's customers....

[6] .... Complainant asserts that defendant's admitted course of conduct in this regard both violates complainant's property right in the news and constitutes unfair competition in business.... As presented in argument, the[] questions are: (1) Whether there is any property in news; (2) Whether, if there be property in news collected for the purpose of being published, it survives the instant of its publication in the first newspaper to which it is communicated by the news-gatherer; and (3) whether defendant's admitted course of conduct in appropriating for commercial use matter taken from bulletins or early editions of Associated Press publications constitutes unfair competition in trade.

[7] The federal jurisdiction was invoked because of diversity of citizenship, not upon the ground that the suit arose under the copyright or other laws of the United States. Complainant's news matter is not copyrighted. It is said that it could not, in practice, be copyrighted, because of the large number of dispatches that are sent daily; and, according to complainant's contention, news is not within the operation of the copyright act. Defendant, while apparently conceding this, nevertheless invokes the analogies of the law of literary property and copyright, insisting as its principal contention that, assuming complainant has a right of property in its news, it can be maintained (unless the copyright act by complied with) only by being kept secret and confidential, and that upon the publication with complainant's consent of uncopyrighted news of any of complainant's members in a newspaper or upon a bulletin board, the right of property is lost, and the subsequent use of the news by the public or by defendant for any purpose whatever becomes lawful....

[8] In considering the general question of property in news matter, it is necessary to recognize its dual character, distinguishing between the substance of the information and the particular form or collocation of words in which the writer has communicated it.

[9] No doubt news articles often possess a literary quality, and are the subject of literary property at the common law; nor do we question that such an article, as a literary production, is the subject of copyright by the terms of the act as it now stands....

[10] But the news element—the information respecting current events contained in the literary production—is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day. It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries' (Const. art. 1, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.

[11] We need spend no time, however, upon the general question of property in news matter at common law, or the application of the copyright act, since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question of unfair competition in business. And, in our opinion, this does not depend upon any general right of property analogous to the common-law right of the proprietor of an unpublished work to prevent its publication without his consent; nor is it foreclosed by showing that the benefits of the copyright act have been waived.
We are dealing here not with restrictions upon publication but with the very facilities and processes of publication. The peculiar value of news is in the spreading of it while it is fresh; and it is evident that a valuable property interest in the news, as news, cannot be maintained by keeping it secret. Besides, except for matters improperly disclosed, or published in breach of trust or confidence, or in violation of law, none of which is involved in this branch of the case, the news of current events may be regarded as common property. What we are concerned with is the business of making it known to the world, in which both parties to the present suit are engaged. That business consists in maintaining a prompt, sure, steady, and reliable service designed to place the daily events of the world at the breakfast table of the millions at a price that, while of trifling moment to each reader, is sufficient in the aggregate to afford compensation for the cost of gathering and distributing it, with the added profit so necessary as an incentive to effective action in the commercial world. The service thus performed for newspaper readers is not only innocent but extremely useful in itself, and indubitably constitutes a legitimate business. The parties are competitors in this field; and, on fundamental principles, applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges of the one are liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of the other.

[12] Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition in business must be determined with particular reference to the character and circumstances of the business. The question here is not so much the rights of either party as against the public but their rights as between themselves. And, although we may and do assume that neither party has any remaining property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first publication, it by no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as between themselves. For, to both of them alike, news matter, however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise. Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the public....

[13] Not only do the acquisition and transmission of news require elaborate organization and a large expenditure of money, skill, and effort; not only has it an exchange value to the gatherer, dependent chiefly upon its novelty and freshness, the regularity of the service, its reputed reliability and thoroughness, and its adaptability to the public needs; but also, as is evident, the news has an exchange value to one who can misappropriate it.

[14] The peculiar features of the case arise from the fact that, while novelty and freshness form so important an element in the success of the business, the very processes of distribution and publication necessarily occupy a good deal of time. Complainant’s service, as well as defendant’s, is a daily service to daily newspapers; most of the foreign news reaches this country at the Atlantic seaboard, principally at the city of New York, and because of this, and of time differentials due to the earth’s rotation, the distribution of news matter throughout the country is principally from east to west; and, since in speed the telegraph and telephone easily outstrip the rotation of the earth, it is a simple matter for defendant to take complainant’s news from bulletins or early editions of complainant’s members in the eastern cities and at the mere cost of telegraphic transmission cause it to be published in western papers issued at least as early as those served by complainant. Besides this, and irrespective of time differentials, irregularities in telegraphic transmission on different lines, and the normal consumption of time in printing and distributing the newspaper, result in permitting pirated news to be placed in the hands of defendant’s readers sometimes simultaneously with the service of competing Associated Press papers, occasionally even earlier.
[15] Defendant insists that when, with the sanction and approval of complainant, and as the result of the use of its news for the very purpose for which it is distributed, a portion of complainant's members communicate it to the general public by posting it upon bulletin boards so that all may read, or by issuing it to newspapers and distributing it indiscriminately, complainant no longer has the right to control the use to be made of it; that when it thus reaches the light of day it becomes the common possession of all to whom it is accessible; and that any purchaser of a newspaper has the right to communicate the intelligence which it contains to anybody and for any purpose, even for the purpose of selling it for profit to newspapers published for profit in competition with complainant's members.

[16] The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves. The right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with complainant's right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to transmit that news for commercial use, in competition with complainant—which is what defendant has done and seeks to justify—is a very different matter. In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the news. The transaction speaks for itself and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in business....

[17] The contention that the news is abandoned to the public for all purposes when published in the first newspaper is untenable. Abandonment is a question of intent, and the entire organization of the Associated Press negatives such a purpose. The cost of the service would be prohibited if the reward were to be so limited. No single newspaper, no small group of newspapers, could sustain the expenditure. Indeed, it is one of the most obvious results of defendant's theory that, by permitting indiscriminate publication by anybody and everybody for purposes of profit in competition with the news-gatherer, it would render publication profitless, or so little profitable as in effect to cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the return. The practical needs and requirements of the business are reflected in complainant's by-laws which have been referred to. Their effect is that publication by each member must be deemed not by any means an abandonment of the news to the world for any and all purposes, but a publication for limited purposes; for the benefit of the readers of the bulletin or the newspaper as such; not for the purpose of making merchandise of it as news, with the result of depriving complainant's other members of their reasonable opportunity to obtain just returns for their expenditures.

[18] It is to be observed that the view we adopt does not result in giving to complainant the right to monopolize either the gathering or the distribution of the news, or, without complying with the copyright act, to prevent the reproduction of its news articles, but only postpones participation by complainant's competitor in the processes of distribution and reproduction of news that it has not gathered, and only to the extent necessary to prevent that competitor from reaping the fruits of complainant's efforts and expenditure, to the partial exclusion of complainant....

[19] It is said that the elements of unfair competition are lacking because there is no attempt by defendant to palm off its goods as those of the complainant, characteristic of the most familiar, if not the most typical,
cases of unfair competition. But we cannot concede that the right to equitable relief is confined to that class of cases....

[20] Besides the misappropriation, there are elements of imitation, of false pretense, in defendant's practices. The device of rewriting complainant's news articles, frequently resorted to, carries its own comment. The habitual failure to give credit to complainant for that which is taken is significant. Indeed, the entire system of appropriating complainant's news and transmitting it as a commercial product to defendant's clients and patrons amounts to a false representation to them and to their newspaper readers that the news transmitted is the result of defendant's own investigation in the field. But these elements, although accentuating the wrong, are not the essence of it. It is something more than the advantage of celebrity of which complainant is being deprived....

HOLMES, J., dissenting:

[21] When an uncopyrighted combination of words is published there is no general right to forbid other people repeating them—in other words there is no property in the combination or in the thoughts or facts that the words express. Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter of fact. Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without compensation. Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference, and a person is not excluded from using any combination of words merely because some one has used it before, even if it took labor and genius to make it. If a given person is to be prohibited from making the use of words that his neighbors are free to make some other ground must be found. One such ground is vaguely expressed in the phrase unfair trade.... But the only reason why it is actionable to make such a representation is that it tends to give the defendant an advantage in his competition with the plaintiff and that it is thought undesirable that an advantage should be gained in that way. Apart from that the defendant may use such unpatented devices and uncopyrighted combinations of words as he likes. The ordinary case, I say, is palming off the defendant's product as the plaintiff's but the same evil may follow from the opposite falsehood—from saying whether in words or by implication that the plaintiff's product is the defendant's, and that, it seems to me, is what has happened here.

[22] Fresh news is got only by enterprise and expense. To produce such news as it is produced by the defendant represents by implication that it has been acquired by the defendant's enterprise and at its expense. When it comes from one of the great news collecting agencies like the Associated Press, the source generally is indicated, plainly importing that credit; and that such a representation is implied may be inferred with some confidence from the unwillingness of the defendant to give the credit and tell the truth. If the plaintiff produces the news at the same time that the defendant does, the defendant's presentation impliedly denies to the plaintiff the credit of collecting the facts and assumes that credit to the defendant. If the plaintiff is later in Western cities it naturally will be supposed to have obtained its information from the defendant. The falsehood is a little more subtle, the injury, a little more indirect, than in ordinary cases of unfair trade, but I think that the principle that condemns the one condemns the other. It is a question of how strong an infusion of fraud is necessary to turn a flavor into a poison. The dose seems to me strong enough here to need a remedy from the law. But as, in my view, the only ground of complaint that can be recognized without legislation is the implied misstatement, it can be corrected by stating the truth; and a suitable acknowledgment of the source is all that the plaintiff can require. I think that within the limits recognized by the decision of the Court the defendant should be enjoined from publishing news obtained from the Associated Press for _____ hours after publication by the plaintiff unless it gives express credit to the Associated Press; the number of hours and the form of acknowledgment to be settled by the District Court.

BRANDEIS, J., dissenting:
An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of exclusion may be absolute; if the property is affected with a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified. But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property. The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use. Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of property is continued after such communication only in certain classes of cases where public policy has seemed to demand it. These exceptions are confined to productions which, in some degree, involve creation, invention, or discovery. But by no means all such are endowed with this attribute of property. The creations which are recognized as property by the common law are literary, dramatic, musical, and other artistic creations; and these have also protection under the copyright statutes. The inventions and discoveries upon which this attribute of property is conferred only by statute, are the few comprised within the patent law. There are also many other cases in which courts interfere to prevent curtailment of plaintiff’s enjoyment of incorporeal productions; and in which the right to relief is often called a property right, but is such only in a special sense. In those cases, the plaintiff has no absolute right to the protection of his production; he has merely the qualified right to be protected as against the defendant’s acts, because of the special relation in which the latter stands or the wrongful method or means employed in acquiring the knowledge or the manner in which it is used. Protection of this character is afforded where the suit is based upon breach of contract or of trust or upon unfair competition.

The knowledge for which protection is sought in the case at bar is not of a kind upon which the law has heretofore conferred the attributes of property; nor is the manner of its acquisition or use nor the purpose to which it is applied, such as has heretofore been recognized as entitling a plaintiff to relief.

Such taking and gainful use of a product of another which, for reasons of public policy, the law has refused to endow with the attributes of property, does not become unlawful because the product happens to have been taken from a rival and is used in competition with him. The unfairness in competition which hitherto has been recognized by the law as a basis for relief, lay in the manner or means of conducting the business; and the manner or means held legally unfair, involves either fraud or force or the doing of acts otherwise prohibited by law.

Competition is not unfair in a legal sense, merely because the profits gained are unearned, even if made at the expense of a rival. He who follows the pioneer into a new market, or who engages in the manufacture of an article newly introduced by another, seeks profits due largely to the labor and expense of the first adventurer; but the law sanctions, indeed encourages, the pursuit.

The means by which the International News Service obtains news gathered by the Associated Press is also clearly unobjectionable. It is taken from papers bought in the open market or from bulletins publicly posted. No breach of contract ... or of trust ...; and neither fraud nor force is involved. The manner of use is likewise unobjectionable. No reference is made by word or by act to the Associated Press, either in transmitting the news to subscribers or by them in publishing it in their papers. Neither the International News Service nor its subscribers is gaining or seeking to gain in its business a benefit from the reputation of the Associated Press. They are merely using its product without making compensation. That they have a legal right to do, because the product is not property, and they do not stand in any relation to the Associated Press, either of contract or of trust, which otherwise precludes such use. The argument is not advanced by characterizing such taking and use a misappropriation.
1. In Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997), the National Basketball Association (NBA) sued Motorola over its handheld Sportstrax pagers that provided real-time information regarding professional basketball games in progress. One of its claims was commercial misappropriation under New York law. The Second Circuit ruled that while misappropriation claims are generally preempted by copyright law, “a narrow ‘hot-news’ misappropriation claim survives preemption for actions concerning material within the realm of copyright.” It reasoned that there were extra elements beyond a copyright infringement claim that allowed it to survive preemption: “(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or service provided by the plaintiff.” The court then concluded that Motorola had not engaged in unlawful “hot-news” misappropriation because some of the elements of the claim were not shown, including free-riding because Motorola collects the scores on its own from the NBA’s games, not by taking from the NBA’s similar service.

In a subsequent case, the Second Circuit held that copyright law preempted financial services companies’ “hot news” misappropriation claim against an online subscription news service that was copying and sharing these firms’ equity research recommendations. The court reasoned that § 301 preempts the plaintiffs’ claim because it is about copyrightable subject matter and implicates the exclusive rights set out in § 106, plus the defendant was not free-riding on the plaintiffs because “[i]t is collecting, collating and disseminating factual information—the facts that [plaintiffs] and others in the securities business have made recommendations with respect to the value of and the wisdom of purchasing or selling securities—and attributing the information to its source. The [plaintiffs] are making the news; [the defendant], despite the [plaintiffs’] understandable desire to protect their business model, is breaking it.”

Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 902 (2d Cir. 2011). What does it mean to “free-ride” on someone else here? Is anything left to state law claims of misappropriation after these rulings?

For an argument that courts have misunderstood the basis of the misappropriation doctrine with regard to news, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011). In particular, Balganesh argues that “the misappropriation doctrine (including its hot news variant) is incapable of creating a property interest, even in traditional intellectual property form, in news. While the doctrine is directed at deterring free riding, it does so in the context of solving a collective action problem that was and is unique to the newspaper industry, related to the practice of cooperative newsgathering.” He then concludes that “[m]isappropriation is … a framework for recovery that draws on unfair competition and unjust enrichment law.” If Balganesh is right, what does that mean for preemption of “hot news” misappropriation claims by copyright law?

2. Is state law protection of ideas preempted by federal copyright law? Recall that ideas are specifically deemed to be unprotected under § 102(b) of copyright law. How would you analyze preemption under § 301? As a matter of conflict preemption? For an argument that idea protection laws are not preempted, see Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703 (2006). Miller reasons that:

[P]reemption analysis ... establishes the upper permissible limit on state idea protection, embodying a fundamental balance struck between creators’ incentives and the public benefit. The Constitution and the Copyright Act articulate this balance. Beneath this federally imposed ceiling, states are free to choose not to give legal status to ideas at all or to regulate as they choose.... [A] regime [c]ould protect mental creativity, taking into account today’s economy, notions of fairness and proper allocation of benefit, and the extent to which major segments of society profit from viable ideas.
Do you agree?

3. Most states now extend to individuals, either by statute or as a matter of common law, a right of publicity, which is a property-like interest in the use of their name, image, voice, signature, or other personal characteristics in commerce or advertising. Are these claims ever preempted by copyright law? In *Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc.*, 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), George Wendt and John Ratzenberger, actors from the television series *Cheers* who played the characters Norm and Cliff, respectively, sued for a violation of their right of publicity based on animatronic robotic figures named Bob and Hank but based (loosely) on their likenesses and placed in airport bars modeled on the bar in the television series. Both are shown in Figure 119.

![Figure 119: Norm and Cliff characters in *Cheers* television series (top), and robot figures in Cheers Airport Bar (bottom)](image)

The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that the claim was preempted on the basis that “the figures appropriate only the identities of the characters Norm and Cliff, to which Paramount owns the copyrights, and not the identities of Wendt and Ratzenberger, who merely portrayed those characters on television and retain no licensing rights to them. They argue that appellants may not claim an appropriation of identity by relying upon indicia, such as the Cheers Bar set, that are the property of, or licensee of, a copyright owner.” In response, Wendt and Ratzenberger “concede[d] that they retain no rights to the characters Norm and Cliff; they argue .... that it is the physical likeness to Wendt and Ratzenberger, not Paramount’s characters, that has commercial value to [the defendant].” The court accepted this characterization and ruled that this claim was not preempted by federal copyright law because it contained elements different in kind from copyright infringement.
By contrast, in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit ruled that federal copyright law, via § 301, preempted baseball players’ claim to a right of publicity in their game performances in a suit against the Major League Baseball Clubs. The court reasoned that “the telecasts are fixed in tangible form because they are recorded simultaneously with their transmission and are audiovisual works which come within the subject matter of copyright” and that the players’ claim was asserting a right in their public performances, which falls squarely within the scope of § 106 of the copyright laws. Moreover, the court determined that the baseball clubs owned the copyright in the game telecasts, so the players could not assert a copyright claim either.

Are these rulings in conflict? Are you more convinced by one or the other decision?

As the right of publicity has expanded to protect persona, some scholars worry about its interference with federal copyright law. For example, Jennifer Rothman argues that “persona should be thought of as the idea of a person rather than the expression of that person,” yet “[c]opyright law explicitly precludes copyright holders from protecting ideas.” Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 205-06 (2002). She would therefore “set forth three situations in which the right must yield to copyright law: first, when a publicity holder’s action is based solely on the use of his or her persona rather than on the publicity holder’s name or likeness; second, when the use at issue was licensed or authorized by a copyright holder who received consent from the publicity holder for the original work; and finally, when the use at issue is explicitly authorized by the Copyright Act.”

4. Recall resale royalties from our discussion in Chapter IV of terminations of transfer. Artist resale royalty rights grant artists a percentage of the proceeds on the resale of their works. Like termination, resale royalty schemes allow artists to benefit down the line should their works become more valuable. Unlike termination, resale royalties provide this benefit by allowing artists to share in the appreciated value of their work but without any renegotiation. A California law passed in 1976 guarantees artists five percent of the profits in a later sale of their artwork. Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that the California law is almost entirely preempted by the 1976 Act pursuant to § 301. Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2018). The court first reasoned that the “plaintiffs’ claims under [California law] for resale royalties on works of ‘fine art’—defined as original paintings, sculptures, drawings, or works in glass—fall within the subject matter of copyright.” Next, the court determined that the “plaintiffs’ [resale royalty] claims assert rights equivalent to the federal distribution right codified in § 106(3), as limited by the first sale doctrine codified in § 109(a).” The court thought that the state and federal rights were not “coextensive,” yet were equivalent: “The two rights differ in that one grants artists the right to receive a percentage payment on all sales of artwork after the first, while the other grants artists the right to receive full payment on the first (and only the first) sale. But, at root, both concern the distribution of copies of artwork and define artists’ right (or lack thereof) to payment on downstream sales of those copies.” Yet the court thought the state law was not preempted by the 1909 Act, which did not contain an express-preemption provision and which it analyzed under principles of conflict preemption. Do you agree with the court’s reasoning?

5. In this chapter, you have learned how parties might—and might not—modify copyright rules by contract. You have also gotten a taste of how states might—and might not—vary or supplement federal copyright law with its own laws. Should the ways individuals and states seek to vary or supplement copyright law affect federal copyright policy? Or should federal copyright policy be determined independently of these others’ actions?